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There are certain ideas of uniformity that sometimes seize great
spirits,... but that infallibly strike small ones. Theyfind in it a kind of
perfection they recognize because it is impossible not to discover it:
in
the police the same weights, in commerce the same measures, in the
state the same laws, and the same religion in every part of it. But is
this always and without exception appropriate?... And does not the
greatness of genius consist rather in knowing in which cases there
must be uniformity and in which differences? . .. When the citizens
1
observe the law, what does it matter ifthey observe the same ones?
I.

THE RESTATEMENTS IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS: MODELING THE
PROBLEM

This article will examine the way in which the American Law
Institute's Restatements have influenced the development of United
States common law. In so doing, the article's vehicle will be the Virgin
Islands, which by statute have adopted the Restatements in their entirety
as the Islands' de facto common law.2 The article's thesis is that the
Virgin Islands, using a speciation analogy drawn from evolutionary
biology, 3 would otherwise have been an excellent environment for
studying the natural development of a common law tailor-made for the
community, as the Islands are physically separated and politically
isolated from the rest of the United States 4 and contain a population with
unique characteristics and needs. 5 Because of their geographic and
political isolation, I have referred to the Virgin Islands as a "legal
backwater.", 6 Using the language of evolutionary biology, a backwater is
often a valuable creative engine and resource. 7 Because, however, the
Islands have employed the Restatements as their default common law,
the natural development of Virgin Islands law has been interrupted.8
This effect has become more significant as the Restatements have
become more normative over time and also have been subjected
increasingly to interest group politics. 9 In the same way, examining the
Restatement movement more generally, the movement has encouraged
1. CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 617 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
2. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 133, 134, 141 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
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an artificial clean-up of the common law and has discouraged the very
backwaters that might otherwise have served, through speciation, as
resources for the development of the law in the manner that best serves
the needs of the community.'0 The crucial question, which this article
seeks to answer, is whether the Restatements have provided an effective
substitute. Ultimately, this question turns on the manner in which the
courts employ the Restatements.
The balance of the introduction explores the way in which the
Restatements have been employed in the Virgin Islands and the manner
in which this decision has affected the natural development of the
Islands' common law.1" The second section describes the Restatement
movement-both its history and the way it has changed over time.' 2 The
third section examines arguments in favor of the courts' use of the
Restatements and suggests that their enumerated positive attributes may
not, standing alone, outweigh any negative consequences of the Virgin
Islands' use of the Restatements as de facto common law. 13 The fourth
section briefly examines, for purposes of comparison, the natural
common-law-making process in jurisdictions outside the Virgin
Islands. 14 The fifth section defines the term "legal backwater,"
introduces the evolutionary biology analogy, and explains why studying
the Virgin Islands is productive in illuminating the effect of the5
Restatement on the development of U.S. common law more generally.'
The sixth and final section seeks to discover whether the courts have
utilized limits that govern the use of the Restatements, so as to
ameliorate any potentially distorting effect.' 6 In each section, the intent
is to use examples from the Islands that may be applied more generally
to all jurisdictions currently employing the Restatements in any capacity,
so as to illuminate the manner in which the Restatements are used
throughout the United States.
The Virgin Islands are one of only two jurisdictions (the other
being the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands)17 in which the
18
Restatements have been adopted as de facto common law, by statute.
Having done so, the legislature of the Virgin Islands has elevated the
10. See infra notes 116-41 and accompanying text.
I. See infra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 40-78 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 116-66 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 167-206 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Restatements from persuasive authority to controlling authority in
matters of first impression. 19 Thus, although the Restatements have been
generally influential in jurisdictions across the United States, their
influence is particularly concentrated in the Virgin Islands.
The relevant statute is Title 1, § 4 of the Virgin Islands Code
Annotated, which provides as follows:
The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of the
law approved by the American Law Institute, and to the extent not so
expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United States,
cases
shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin Islands in
20
to which they apply, in the absence of local laws to the contrary.

Although the statute has been applied in over two hundred reported
cases, its language has never expressly been interpreted. 2' Therefore, the
statute remains unclear as to whether the language "as expressed" means
that Virgin Islands courts are expected to undertake an independent
analysis of whether the Restatements express United States common
law, or whether the courts are to assume that, when the Restatements
have purported to express common law, they have done so accurately.
19. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
20. 1 V.I. CODE ANN. § 4 (2000). The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
adopted a very similar provision in its 1984 code. 7 N. MAR. I. CODE § 3401 provides as follows:
In all proceedings, the rules of the common law as expressed in the restatements of the
law approved by the American Law Institute and, to the extent not so expressed, as
generally understood and applied in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in
the courts of the Commonwealth, in the absence of written law or local customary law to
the contrary; provided that no person shall be subject to criminal prosecution except
under the written law of the Commonwealth.
7 N. MAR. I. CODE § 3401 (1997). This article will employ cases from the Northern Mariana
Islands, when relevant, to supplement those from the Virgin Islands. The Northern Mariana Islands
share many of the qualities that have caused me to term the Virgin Islands a legal backwater. See
infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (describing pertinent characteristics of the Virgin
Islands).
The Northern Mariana Islands were formerly part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific,
which the United Nations granted to the United States in 1947. In 1975, the Islands decided, rather
than seeking independence, to seek a closer relationship with the United States. A covenant was
approved to establish the Commonwealth as a political union with the United States. In 1986, the
islands became a United States Commonwealth, and their residents became United States citizens.
See CIA World Factbook 2003, available at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cq.html.
The Islands share a number of characteristics with the Virgin Islands, including geographic isolation
from the United States mainland, particular susceptibility to weather-related disasters, primary
reliance upon tourism for revenue, low-fertility soil, a recent focus on developing small
manufacturing industries, and little immigration from the United States. Like residents of the Virgin
Islands, residents of the Northern Mariana Islands are United States citizens but do not vote in
national elections. Compare infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text with CIA World Factbook
2003, available at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cq.html.
21. See generally Annotations, 1 V.I. CODE ANN. § 4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/3

4

Adams: The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement
2004]

THE FOLLY OF UNIFORMITY?

Specifically, it has never been determined whether the phrase "as
expressed" requires only that the Restatements have addressed an area of
United States common law, or requires that they have done so
accurately. At least one court has assumed that the former approach is
the appropriate one.2 2 In the meantime, without deciding the issue, it
appears that the courts have interpreted the statute in varying ways.
Some courts simply recite the ambiguous language of the statute. 23 Other
courts, rather than using the specific language of the statute, refer
variously to the Restatements 24 to the common law of the United States
as captured in the Restatements, 25 or simply to the common law of the
United States,26 in describing the authority they are to follow. In
22. Christian v. Newfound Bay, 144 F. Supp. 2d 420, 429 (D.V.I. 2001) ("[U]nder § 4, the
Court must look first to the common law rules set forth in the various Restatements. If no rules are
available, the Court is to look to common law rules 'as generally understood and applied in the
United States."' (quoting Dunn v. Hovic, I F.3d 1371, 1387 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted)).
23. See In re Estate of Imamura, 5 N. Mar. I. 60, 66 (N. Mar. I. 1997) ("[W]e must look to
'the rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of the law approved by the American
Law Institute, and, to the extent not so expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United
States."') (quoting 7 N. MAR. I. CODE § 3401); Borja v. Goodman, I N. Mar. I. 63, 68-69 (N. Mar.
1. 1990) (same holding); Tenorio v. Reliable Collection Agency, Inc., 2003 WL 23150110 at * 4 (N.
Mar. I. Dec. 31, 2003) (same holding).
24. See Benjamin v. Cleburne Truck & Body Sales, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (D.V.I.
1976) ("1 V.I.C. § 4 incorporates into the law of the Virgin Islands the rules expressed in the
restatements of the law .. "); Bower v. O'Hara, 759 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[W]e are
directed to the text of the Restatements, and we may look beyond them only if no rule of decision is
there expressed."); Co-Build Cos., Inc. v. Virgin Islands Refinery Corp., 570 F.2d 492, 494 (3d Cir.
1978) ("When no precedents relate specifically to the adjudication of a Virgin Islands dispute, the
courts are directed to turn to the various Restatements of Law, approved by the American Law
Institute, which are to provide the rules of decision for such cases in the absence of local laws to the
contrary."); Bd. of Dirs. v. Consol. Int'l., Inc., 28 V.I. 57, 75 n.12 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1993) ("In the
absence of written or case law to the contrary, the Restatements of the Law are the rule of law in
this jurisdiction."); Wilson v. Joseph, 28 V.I 29, 33 n.2 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1992) (same holding).
25. See In re Estate of Seman, 4 N. Mar. I. 129, 131-32 (N. Mar. I. 1994) ("[I]n the absence of
local written or customary law,... we consider the common law as enunciated in the
Restatements."); Castro v. Hotel Nikko Saipan, Inc., 4 N. Mar. I. 268, 272 n.5 (N. Mar. I. 1994) ("In
the absence of contrary statutory or customary law, this Court applies the common law as expressed
in the Restatements."); Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections, 5 N. Mar. I. 188, 201 (N. Mar. I. 1998)
(quoting Castro, 4 N. Mar. I. at 272); I.G.I. Gen. Contractor & Dev., Inc. v. Public Sch. Sys., 5 N.
Mar. 1. 250, n.p. (N. Mar. I. 1999) (applying "the rules of the common law, as expressed in the
restatements of law .... ").
26. See Mundo v. Commonwealth Super. Ct., 4 N. Mar. I. 392, 396 (N. Mar. I. 1996) ("[T]he
courts of the Commonwealth are bound by the common law of the fifty states only 'in the absence
of written law or local customary law to the contrary."') (quoting 7. N. MAR. I. CODE § 3401); In re
Estate of Barcinas, 4 N. Mar. I. 149, 153 (N. Mar. 1. 1994) ("Since there is no applicable customary
law, we shall apply the common law."); Commonwealth v. Manglona, 5 N. Mar. I. 128, 4 (N.
Mar. I. 1997) ("In the absence of written law or local customary law to the contrary, the courts must
apply the rules of the common law, as generally understood and applied in the United States.");
Thomburgh v. Thorburgh, 5 N. Mar. I. 125, 19 (N. Mar. I. 1997) (using the same language as
Manglona, 5 N. Mar. I. 128); Maffias v. Commonwealth, 2 N. Mar. I. 248, 255 n.4 (N. Mar. I. 1991)
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addition, it seems clear, when no Restatement provision exists on point,
and the common-law decisions are split, that Virgin Islands judges are
free to exercise their discretion in selecting the sounder rule.27 As is
discussed below in Part VI, this uncertainty may present an opportunity
for flexibility, providing a means by which judges can choose to avoid
the application of Restatement rules they believe to lack substantive
merit.
The origins of this statute are in the Islands' history as a Danish
colony, during which time the Islands' law was based on the common
law of Denmark. 28 Following the Islands' becoming a dependency of the
United States in 1917, the Islands' new code of 1921 included language
similar to that of the codes that were in place under Danish rule, but now
("U.S. common law rules are the 'rules of decision' in the absence of N.M.I. written law or local
customary law to the contrary."); Ada v. Sablan, 1 N. Mar. I. 164, 166 (N. Mar. I. 1990) (using
similar language to Mafnas, 2 N. Mar. I. at 255).
27. See Christian, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 429 ("Where the Restatement is silent and a split of
authority exists, the Courts should select the sounder rule.").
28. The Virgin Islands of the United States formerly were called the Danish West Indies.
Bette A. Taylor, CRS Report for Congress. The Virgin Islands of the United States: A Descriptive
and HistoricalProfile CRS-3 (June 13, 1988).
Sections 67, respectively, of the Colonial Law for the Danish West India Islands of
November 27, 1863 and the Colonial Law for the Danish West India Islands of April 6,
1906 ... , provided that "the Common and Statute Law of Denmark shall as hitherto be
applicable in the colonies, as more accurately defined by the Laws and Ordinances."
See History, 1 V.I. CODE ANN. § 4.
The Islands are now an organized, unincorporated United States territory. Taylor, supra at
CRS-29-30 (describing the implications of "unincorporated" status, including the fact that Congress
is "bound only by certain 'fundamental' guarantees of the Constitution" with regard to the
unincorporated dependencies of the United States); John Willis Walters, A Political History of the
United States Virgin Islands, 1917 to 1967, at 34 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University) (on file with author) ("The Constitution and laws of the United States would not
immediately apply to the newly acquired territory because it was not an 'organized territory."');
Gregory R. La Motta, The Americanization of the Virgin Islands, 1917-1946: Politics and Class
Struggle During the First Thirty Years of American Rule 71 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Maryland) (on file with author) (noting that such "Supreme Court rulings pushed
small colonies such as the Virgin Islands into an often desperate struggle to get Congress to pay
attention to their particular needs").
Today, some vestiges of this separate and subordinate role remain in the relationship
between the federal government and Virgin Islanders. Residents of the Virgin Islands elect a single,
nonvoting delegate to the United States House of Representatives. Taylor, supra at CRS-43. Virgin
Islanders do not participate in the election of the President of the United States. Id.
During the 17th Century, the Islands were divided into English and Danish territories.
After negotiations dating back to the United States Civil War, in 1917, the United States purchased
the Danish territory for $25 million. Id. at CRS-61 (describing the initial discussions between
Danish Minister Waldemar R. Raasloff and Secretary of State William H. Seward in 1865); Id. at
CRS-68 (describing the eventual purchase). March 31, a territorial holiday in the Islands, marks the
Islands' transfer from Denmark to the United States, which took place in 1917. Id. at CRS-68
(describing the formal transfer ceremonies in Charlotte Amalie in St. Thomas).
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focused on the common law of the United States rather than that of
Denmark.29 It does not appear that there was any immediate intention to
permit the Islands to create their own laws. 30 After so many years of
colonial rule, it may have felt more natural to the Islands at that time to
look to the United States, an external source, for their laws. 3'
The Virgin Islands Code was revised in 1957 to include a specific
reference to the Restatements for the first time. This revision followed
the Third Circuit case of Callwood v. Virgin Islands National Bank.32
The Callwood court, considering a conflict-of-laws dispute, held in
relevant part as follows:
The generally accepted common law rule of conflict of laws is that the
effect of an assignment of a chose in action is determined by the law of
the place where the assignment is executed. This is the rule laid down
29. "Section 6 of Chapter 13 of Title IV of the 1921 Codes [of St. Thomas, St. John, and St.
Croix] ... provided that 'The common law of England as adopted and understood in the United
States shall be in force in this District, except as modified by this ordinance [code].' Taylor, supra
note 28, at CRS-68; see also Smith v. deFreitas, 329 F.2d 629, 633 n.2 (3d Cir. 1964) (indicating
that the common law of the United States came into force in the Virgin Islands on July 1, 1921).
Until that time, Danish common law continued to be in force. La Motta, supra note 28, at 72 ("To
emphasize the continuity between Danish and American sovereignty, Section II of the
[Congressional] Act [of March 3, 1917] stipulated that the Danish Colonial Law of 1906 would
remain the basic law of the Virgin Islands."). Indeed, it appears that some of the Naval governing
officials enjoyed the increased power that the Danish law provided to them during this time. Id. at
74 ("Instead of working to establish an independent judiciary, the governors sought to retain their
powers over judges granted them by the Danish laws.").
30. "It was presumed that the masses were not sufficiently Americanized to assume the
responsibility of democratic government." Walters, supra note 28, at 54; see also La Motta, supra
note 28, at 66 ("Viewing themselves as teachers of the 'American way of life,' the Navy officials
felt obliged to instruct an inferior people in a better manner of living."). Walters indicates that this
sentiment on the part of the United States government may have been grounded in racial prejudice.
Walters, supra note 28, at 64 ("Governor Evans [appointed by the U.S. Government for the term
1927-1931] maintained the policies of previous governors-economic and social reform before
political advancement. He, too, thought that blacks were not ready to run their own affairs."). See
also La Motta, supra note 28, at 68 ("Their new rulers' racism shocked and disappointed Virgin
Islanders."). As early as 1925, an "all-black commission" appointed by the Governor of the Virgin
Islands "recommended the... adoption of a unified code of laws, based on American law, for the
Virgin Islands." Walters, supra note 28, at 62-63.
31. For a discussion of the influence of United States culture on the Virgin Islands, and the
high initial hopes of the Virgin Islands people for their new relationship with the United States, see
Walters, supra note 28, at 99. Walters quotes influential Virgin Islands newspaper editor Rothschild
Francis, editor of The Emancipatorfrom 1919 to 1927, as follows:
Francis maintained that Virgin Islanders "have always clamored for America and things
American; our lives, our customs and traditions have been molded and patterned more
after Americans than after Denmark and Danes; and we accepted the transfer with hearts
full of throbbing pulsation and high hopes for our future betterment under the Starry
Banner."
Id.
32. 221 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1955).
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in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. It is, therefore, to be applied in
the Virgin Islands in the absence of a local statute or rule to the
contrary. For the Virgin Islands have adopted the rules of the common
law of England as followed and understood in the United States and
we think that the district court in applying those rules is justified in
following the well considered expressions of them which the American
33
Law Institute has incorporated in its Restatements of the Law.

Perhaps it is significant that the author of the opinion, Judge Albert
Maris, was an active member of the American Law Institute at that
time.3 4 It is also important to note that this decision was not made by a
33. Id. at 774-75 (citations omitted). The last sentence is, of course, the critical part of this
holding.
34. Judge Maris was a member of the advisory committee to the American Law Institute's
Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, published in 1969.
American Law Institute, ALl Catalog, http://www.ali-aba.org/ali/stujur fed.htm (last visited Feb.
9, 2005). He was also an advisor to the Restatement of Law, Conflict of Laws. Id.
It is difficult to get an accurate picture of Judge Maris, a President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt appointee to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
elevated by Roosevelt two years later to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and, at the time of his
death in 1989, after 52 years on the bench, the longest-serving federal judge in United States
history. Dolores K. Sloviter, Memorial Tribute to the HonorableAlbert Branson Maris, 1893-1989,
62 TEMP. L. REv. 471, 475-76 (1989) (noting that "Judge Mars' last opinion was filed the day
before he died"). On the one hand is the loving tribute paid to him by fellow Third Circuit Judge
and American Law Institute member Dolores K. Sloviter, in which he is described as "the Moses for
the Virgin Islands" and "'practically the patron saint' of those islands." Id. at 473, 475 ("Judge
Almeric Christian frequently has said that Virgin Islands residents believe 'that when Judge Maris
comes down to the Virgin Islands, he eschews boat and plane. He walks."'). Id. at 473. Judge
Sloviter describes Judge Maris' work in the Virgin Islands as follows:
He wrote its Organic Act in 1954, replacing the outmoded 1936 Act; was a member of
the Commission that codified the laws of the Virgin Islands into the Virgin Islands Code
and arranged for its printing; and authored the consolidation in 1964 of the Islands'
separate municipal courts into one judicial body.
Id. at 473. She goes on to describe the influence of his work as follows:
Almost single-handedly, he organized their system of laws and judiciary. It was said of
him, "the Virgin Islands' mind cannot conceive of a single aspect of our affairs in our
upward struggle which was not the legatee of Judge Maris's deep concern and wisdom.
Spiritual godfather of us all, he has unstintingly given of himself without heed to
personal sacrifice." His contribution has been colossal.
Id. at 475. In further describing his career, Judge Sloviter emphasizes his position as Chairman of
the Judicial Conference's Committee of Revision of the Laws of the United States, his receipt of the
first Virgin Islands Gold Medal of Honor, and his service as Special Master for the United States
Supreme Court. See id. at 472-73. Judge Sloviter delivered near-identical remarks at the Joint
Session of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Memory of Albert Branson Maris on March 9,
1989. 894 F.2d 3 (1989).
On the other hand are the statements of Professor Mark Tushnet in his review of the 1985
book by Gilbert Ware, William Hastie: Grace under Pressure.Mark Tushnet, Being First,37 STAN.
L. REv. 1181 (1985). William Hastie was the first Governor of the Virgin Islands, having been
appointed in 1946, and served as Governor during a portion of Judge Maris' tenure on the Third
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local court of the Virgin Islands, but instead by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in its position of general appellate
jurisdiction over all matters heard, not only by the United States District
Court in the Virgin Islands, but also by local Territorial Courts.3 5 Thus,
this cannot be fairly characterized as the ruling of a local court of the
Virgin Islands. In what became 1 V.I. Code Ann. § 4, the Virgin Islands
Senate codified the Callwood holding.36 The Senate described its
decision as follows:
As set out herein, the provisions have been rewritten more accurately
to express the concept of the Common Law as constituting a body of
rules established by precedent, as distinguished from a body of
Circuit. (Later, Governor Hastie joined the court, as well.). See id. at 1183. Professor Tushnet
includes Judge Marls in his statement that "one would be hard-pressed to defend the proposition that
any of these judges had an especially distinctive place in American history." Id. at 1184 n.12. He
does not recognize Mars as having been remarkable in his service to the American Law Institute,
either. See id. ("I would guess that, if anyone ever wrote a three volume history of the United States
in the twentieth century, the only one who might be mentioned by name is [Third Circuit Judge and
Maris contemporary Herbert] Goodrich, for his role in the American Law Institute."). Tushnet
concludes as follows: "Basically the Third Circuit, like most of the federal courts of appeals, was an
ordinary intermediate appellate court, occasionally deciding an interesting case but mostly grinding
out routine decisions." Id. at 1185 n.12.
35. Prior to 1976, the United States District Court of the Virgin Islands had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all territorial civil and criminal matters. After the Territorial Court of the
Virgin Islands was established in 1976, the Islands began to transfer concurrent jurisdiction over all
local matters to the new court from the District Court. See Parrott v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 56
F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (D.V.I. 1999) (citing 4 V.I. CODE § 76(a)). As of January 1, 1994, the process
was complete and the District Court was fully divested of its original jurisdiction over all local
matters. Id. When this process was complete, the District Court had only the limited jurisdiction of
any other United States District Court. Id. (further stating, "[a]lthough the emergence of separate
local and federal judiciaries in the Virgin Islands is a salutary development, our institutions and
laws have experienced some growing pains."). At this time, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit continues to have general appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by both
the District Court and the Territorial Courts, pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613. Taylor, supra note 28, at
CRS-42; see also V.I. Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 23 (1995) ("[Fior the first fifteen years
following the establishment of the appellate court authorized by section 21 (a) of this Act, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit shall have jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari
all final decisions of the highest court of the Virgin Islands from which a decision could be had.");
Parrott v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 230 F.3d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing the current
jurisdiction of both the District Court and the Third Circuit). The President appoints judges to the
District Court, and the Governor appoints the judges sitting on the Territorial Court. Taylor, supra
note 28, at CRS-41, CRS-42. To date, the Virgin Islands have not developed their own Supreme
Court, although there has been some showing of interest, among members of the legal community,
in doing so. Virgin Islands Bar Elects Officers; Advocates Establishing V1Supreme Court, V.I. BAR
HERALD, Mar. 11, 2002 (quoting Chief Deputy Attorney General Alva Swan as saying, "the time
has come for the Virgin Islands to have its own court of appeals"). Bar President Tom Bolt echoed
this sentiment: "It is ... important," he stated, "that we educate the Virgin Islands public as to the
critical need to remove this last vestige of judicial colonialism." Id.
36. See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
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statutory law, and to extend the application of the rules to the
restatements
of the law prepared and approved by the American Law
37
Institute.

In enacting the new statute, the Senate expanded Callwood in an

important respect. In Callwood, the court had acted as many' other
United States courts have in adopting a single provision of a single
Restatement, having determined that provision to represent accurately
the common law of the United States. Indeed, as is discussed below in
Part IV, this is how common-law courts historically have made law,

moving slowly and incrementally, one case at a time.38 The Virgin
Islands Senate followed the Callwood court's incremental, ordinary step

with a sweeping, extraordinary measure by declaring that all provisions
of all Restatements were to be considered as being representative of
United States common law. As the citations in Part II demonstrate, the
nature of the Restatement movement has changed over time to become
more normative and possibly also more vulnerable to interest-group
politics.

39

As this trend has developed, the implications of the Senate's

decision have changed accordingly.
II.

THE RESTATEMENT MOVEMENT, ITS VISION AND PHILOSOPHY

The American Law Institute was founded in 1923 .40 Its founding
was the result of a study conducted by a "committee on the

establishment of a permanent organization for the improvement of
law., 41 The committee, consisting of prominent judges, attorneys, and

37. History, 1 V.I. CODE ANN. § 4 (citing Callwood,221 F.2d at 770).
38. See infra notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 40-73 and accompanying text.
40. American Law Institute, The American Law Institute Seventy-Fifth Anniversary 19231998, at 7 (1998) ("[I]n 1923, President Warren G. Harding died from pneumonia in San Francisco,
Adolph Hitler staged his 'Beer Hall Putsch,' Colonel Jacob Schick patented the first electric razor,
and author Felix Salton wrote Bambi. Also, the American Law Institute was incorporated on
February 23.") [hereinafter ALl, Anniversary].
41. Id. at 8-9 (describing an initial meeting of 20 people on May 10, 1922, at the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York). The history of the American Law Institute has been examined
too well by too many others for me to undertake that same task here. See generally Victor E.
Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability-the American Law Institute's
Process of Democracy andDeliberation, 26 HOFsTRA L. REv. 743 (1998); David B. Massey, Note,
How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement of
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 419 (1997); Daniel J. Klau, Note,
What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 511
(1990); see also Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds
Substance, 75 CAL. L. REv. 15 (1987) (providing an excellent and concise general history of efforts
to record the law in the United States).
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law professors, was responding to what it felt were two major defects in
American law: its uncertainty and complexity. 42 The committee found
that these two defects "had produced a general dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice. '' 3 Out of these concerns, the committee
formed the American Law Institute, which has, ever since that time,
undertaken to restate certain areas of the common law of the United
States. 44 The first Restatements were intended to address 45"basic legal
subjects" and to "tell judges and lawyers what the law was."

42. ALl, Anniversary,supra note 40, at 9 (describing the "deplorable state of the law" prior to
the Restatements). According to the committee, part of the uncertainty of the law, as it then existed,
was due to the lack of agreement among members of the profession on "the fundamental principles
of the common law." Id. Other causes of uncertainty were reported as "lack of precision in the use
of legal terms," "badly drawn statutory provisions," and "the great volume" of reported decisions.
Id. "The law's complexity, on the other hand, was attributed in significant part to its 'lack of
systematic development' and to its numerous variations within the different jurisdictions of the
United States." See American Law Institute, About the American Law Institute [hereinafter ALl,
About the ALI], availableat http://www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm. This article will argue in favor of the
variety of law, regardless of whether it stems from adaptation to different environments or simply
from varying efforts to address the same question. Exceptions should be made for areas of law, such
as the Uniform Commercial Code, in which uniformity is essential due to the expectations of
interstate commerce. Property law and tort law, by contrast, are essentially local in nature.
43. ALl, About the ALl, supra note 42.
44. The Council and membership of the Institute must approve any new Restatement project
before it begins. ALl RULES OF THE COUNCIL 11.02 (A) ("Material intended for publication must
first be submitted to the Council, and by it to the members."). After the concept is approved, an
expert in the field is designated to serve as the reporter for the project. Id. at 10.01 ("Each project of
the Institute is normally put in the charge of a reporter or reporters authorized by the Director with
the approval of the Council or the Executive Committee."). The reporter, along with assistants,
prepares an initial draft and is responsible for the body of research to be done, so as to complete the
project. Id. at 10.02 ("The Director may, with the approval of the Council or the Executive
Committee, appoint advisors or consultants to review a reporter's drafts, and may employ assistants
to aid a reporter."). See infra note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of how two reporters,
Judge Cardozo and Justice Traynor, supposedly used their positions in the American Law Institute
to advance their own hoped-for changes in the law.
When complete, the initial draft is submitted to a group often to thirty advisors who, like
the reporter, are experts in the area being restated. ALt RULES OF THE COUNCIL 10.02 (authorizing
the appointment of advisors to review a draft). In addition, most initial drafts are reviewed by a
members consultative group. Id. at 10.03 ("The Director may establish a members consultative
group for an Institute project to review a reporter's drafts."). This group consists of Institute
members with particular interest in the area. Id. ("Any member of the Institute may join a members
consultative group, the meetings of which may be held with some or all members at times and
places designated by the Director."). See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for a discussion
of how low participation rates among American Law Institute members may have resulted in
domination of the Restatement drafting process by an interested few. See also Lawrence J. Latto,
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View from the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV.
697, 700, 702 (1998) (Latto reports the same phenomenon and further notes the many other
demands on members' time, especially that of associate reporters. He concludes that the resulting
product is thus necessarily the brainchild of the Reporter.).
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Despite the project's name, some evidence suggests that the
Restatements were never meant simply to re-state the common law of
the United States. The language of the Institute's charter is illustrative:
its purpose is "to promote the clarificationand simplification of the law
and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better
administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and
scientific legal work. '46 As is discussed below, the American Law
The Council of the Institute considers the draft once it has been approved by the advisors
and the members consultative group, and any revisions have been made. ALI RULES OF THE
COUNCIL 11.02 (B) ("The Council may submit the material to the membership with or without the
Council's approval, amendment, or recommendation."). The Council typically has about seventy
members. American Law Institute, Annual Report of the American Law Institute 2002, at 66-67,
available at http://www.ali.org (listing the sixty-nine current members of the council); see also
BYLAWS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 4.02 (requiring that the Council consist of at least 42
members). Once the Council has approved the draft, it becomes known as a Tentative Draft. See
ALI, About the ALl, supra note 42. "The membership may approve the Tentative Draft, subject to
any revisions agreed to, or refer it back to the Reporter and Advisers for additional consideration."
Id. See infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which the courts of
the Virgin Islands have considered the proper weight to be afforded a Tentative Draft. The final step
in the process is a Proposed Final Draft, which consists of all prior Tentative Drafts. See ALI, About
the ALl, supra. The Proposed Final Draft becomes an official text of the Institute and is ready for
publication after it has been approved by both the Council and the full membership. Id,
The first series of Restatements were written between 1923 and 1944 and covered the
topics of Agency, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Judgments, Property, Restitution, Security, Torts,
and Trusts. ALI, Anniversary, supra note 40, at 40 (listing the past and present projects of the
Institute). In addition, Restatements of Business Associations and Sales of Land were begun but not
completed. The second Restatement series, begun in 1952, added Landlord and Tenant Law as a
subsection of the Restatement of Property and further added a Restatement of the ForeignRelations
Law of the UnitedStates. Id. The third Series began in 1987 and included for the first time the Law
Governing Lawyers. Id.
The Rules of the Council authorize an elected membership of 3,000 judges, lawyers, and
law professors from the United States and around the world. ALI RULES OF THE COUNCIL 1.01. In
addition, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, the
Chief Judges of each United States Court of Appeals, the Attorney General and Solicitor General of
the United States, the Chief Justice or Chief Judge of the highest court of each state, law school
Deans, and the Presidents of the American Bar Association, each state bar association, and other
prominent legal organizations are ex officio members. Id. at 1.03 (noting that some of these
individuals are made members for life, while others are members only during their terms of office).
After 25 years, elected members are eligible to become life members and, as such, are no longer
counted among the 3,000. Id. at 1.02 (indicating that life members are not numbered among the
3,000); Id. at 1.05 (describing the requirements for life membership). The total current membership
is about 3,600. See ALl, About the ALl, supra note 42.
45. ALl, About the ALl, supra note 42.
46. American Law Institute, Certificate of Incorporation,in Annual Report of the American
Law Institute 2002, supra note 44, at 51; see also http://www.ali.org for the Certificate of
Incorporation. In addition, Livingston Hall used the following language in praising law professor
Warren Seavey for his early role in the Restatement movement: "He believed the form of the
Restatements to be an ideal vehicle through which law teachers might influence the development of
case law. Written for lawyers and judges, the Restatements served 'to bring back to our American
law some semblance of order and consistency,' as he phrased it."
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Institute continues to struggle, some eighty-one years after its founding,
to determine what its mission is and should be. 47
One scholar has challenged whether simple clarification of the law
without undue distortion is even possible, given the rich and complex
historical and contextual nature of the common law. 48 It is arguable that
the very nature of re-stating the law, publishing it in what is declared to
be a summary form, requires some change, some artificial cleaning-up of
the law. Borrowing from the language of Roscoe Pound in describing the
nature of enactment of the law, the publication of the law necessitates
changing the law by presenting the law as being more consistent than it
truly is. 4 9 Robert Berring makes the point more strongly: "There is no
structure to the law... other than what the
underlying rational
5°
positivists give it.

Livingston Hall, Warren Seavey and the Age of the Restatement, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1329, 1330
(1966). It is possible to argue that a professor's participation in the American Law Institute's
Restatement project constitutes a conflict of interest. For teachers, consistency makes law more
teachable. Indeed, Hall's description of Seavey's participation in the process draws this parallel.
I have always believed that Seavey thought in Restatement terms. Logical order, internal
consistency, completeness, clear illustrative cases, brevity - these were his intellectual
goals.... His Restatements created a unified and teachable body of law out of the mass
of independent doctrines of agency, contracts, and master and servant bequeathed to him
by his intellectual predecessors in the field.
Id. at 1331.
47. Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck's Sausages and the ALIs Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817, 818 (1998) ("Notwithstanding the rather clear implication that the work of this
organization would consist of more than meekly parroting existing law, the ALI perennially
witnesses struggles over the concept of a Restatement.").
48. James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 140, 140 (1981) (quoting earlier Restatement scholar and critic Charles Clark as
"complain[ing] of the 'attempt to force a black letter sentence to do what itcan never do-state
pages of history and policy and honest study and deliberation'). Gordley goes on to "suggest[ ] ...
[that] clarity and simplicity are not advantages that should be sought from a restatement or a civil
code: either they cannot be obtained or the cost of obtaining them is too high." Id.
49.

ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4 (Yale Univ. Press

1982) (rev. ed. 1954) (noting that "popular demand for publication results in a body of enactment").
Pound states as follows, in describing the law-making process in Greek law during the Hellenistic
Period: "At first enactments are no more than declaratory. But it was an easy step from publication
of established custom to publication of changes as if they were established custom and thus to
conscious and avowed changes and intentional new rules through legislation." Id.
50. Berring, supra note 41, at 26. Berring presents the problem as hardly being new. He
describes chronicler of the law William Blackstone, according to his critics, as "bending the data to
fit his needs." Id.at 16; see also DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN
ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 22 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1996) (1941) (describing

Blackstone's commentaries as follows: "Any data that could not be distilled into 'principles' could
be disregarded for they were by definition no part of a 'science of law."'). Berring's description of
the modem West Digest reporting system raises similar concerns about the artificial elimination of
outlier results. Berring, supra note 41, at 25 ("Language and concepts were normalized as the West
editor prepared the headnotes for each case.").
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An early, conscious decision was made not to pursue codification
the
Restatements. 5 1 Instead, the Restatements are to have only
of
persuasive authority.52 Although this appears to be an uncontroversial
point on which the American Law Institute has remained steadfast over
time, one scholar has asserted that-at least initially-the Restatements
were meant to supersede the common law. 53 Whatever the initial goal of
the Restatements, it is clear that the American Law Institute's reputation54
is important to the success of these, its most significant product.
Because of the high level of respect that the American Law Institute has
earned, the Restatements' taking a certain position is likely to influence
the development of the law. 55 One scholar goes so far as to assert that the
Restatements' adoption of a given rule of law may "bait" other courts to
follow its analysis, even if flawed.56 Indeed, the American Law Institute
51. ALl, Anniversary, supra note 40, at 11 (noting that "the goal was to maintain the
flexibility of the common law"). On this point, it is interesting that the Virgin Islands has done that
which the American Law Institute would not.
52. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 743 ("Although ALl restatements have no force of law on
their own, they have had a persuasive impact on the courts."); Frank J. Vandall, The American Law
Institute is Dead in the Water, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 814 (1998) ("The ALl can print anything it
wants. First-year students are taught that Restatements are secondary authority and persuasive
only.").
53. Berring, supra note 41, at 23 ("This codification of the common law was intended to
create an edifice that would make it unnecessary to refer to the larger underlying body of case law.
Because they intended to supersede case law, the first Restatements did not even mention case
names."). Compare BOORSTtN, supra note 50, at 3 (describing Blackstone's commentaries, as
follows: "In the first century of American independence, the Commentaries were not merely an
approach to the study of law; for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law").
54. Massey, supra note 41, at 424 ("Existing Restatements of domestic law [prior to the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law] already carried considerable weight because of the
ALI's eminence and the thoroughness of its drafting process."); Brody v. Albert Lifson & Sons,
Inc., II1 A.2d 504, 507 (N.J. 1955) (describing a form of negligence and stating, "This rule is set
forth in section 302(b) of the... Restatement of the Law, Torts (Negligence) and as such has the
persuasive authority resulting from the scholarship and study of the members of the Institute who
agreed to them.").
55. Massey, supra note 41, at 424 ("Commentators... noted that the Restatement (Third) [of
Foreign Relations Law] might contribute to the formation of customary law, as foreign governments
would rely on it when it supported their cases and use it against the U.S. government as a statement
of U.S. practice, notwithstanding the Restatement (Third)'s disclaimer that it is an independent
work and does not represent the view of the U.S. government as to its legal obligations."); Allan F.
Conwill & William W. Ellis, Jr., Much Ado About Nothing: The Real Effect of Amended 60(A) on
Accounts Receivable Financing,64 HARV. L. REV. 62, 66 (1950) ("The relative position of this rule
[requiring that lien creditors be notified when contracts are assigned to third parties] was probably
enhanced by its incorporation in the Restatement of Contracts .... ).
56. Peter Lake, Virginia Is Not Safe for "Lovers ": The Virginia Supreme Court Rejects
Tarasoff in Nasser v. Parker, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (1995) (describing the Nasser v.
Parker court's holding that, in contrast to the rule established in Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California,a psychotherapist has no duty to warn of a patient's death threats against a
third party). "Although Nasser [v. Parker] is an aberration-destined for use in torts casebooks as
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itself represents that "[m]any Institute publications have been accorded
an authority greater than that imparted to any legal treatise, an authority
more nearly comparable to that accorded to judicial decisions. 57 This
degree of influence may be particularly likely when the Restatement is
of an area of law with which many practitioners and judges are
unfamiliar.5 8 In addition, when a legislature like that of the Virgin
Islands adopts the Restatements as the de facto common law of the
jurisdiction, the Restatements of the American Law Institute become
precedential, rather than merely persuasive, authority. Due to the
Restatements' influence as shown in these various ways, the American
Law Institute has at times been instrumental in changing the course of
American case law. 59
A.

Changing Goals of the Restatement

Several scholars have stated that the persuasive authority of the
Restatements depends on their being a true and accurate representation

counterpoint to Tarasoffand doomed to condemnation-its reliance upon the Restatement (Second)
of Torts could bait other courts into following its flawed analysis." Id. at 1286.
57. See ALl, About the ALI, supra note 42.
58. Massey, supra note 41, at 424.
There was agreement that the Restatement (Third) [of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States] would be influential-even treated as a "bible" by judges and
practitioners who are generally unfamiliar with international law and who may find it
difficult to obtain evidence of state practice and opinio juris .... The likely influence of
the Restatement (Third) magnified the importance of its stating customary law
accurately, given the ALI's claim that its document reflected state practice and opinio
juris.
Id. (citations omitted). Charles Wolfram, Chief Reporter for the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, made a similar statement with regard to the Restatements generally:
Statutes, if minimally constitutional, will be enforced by courts, however much a
constrained litigant may protest. Restatements can have the same dire consequencerelied upon by a tribunal for a proposition that burdens a litigant in a proceeding no
matter how strenuous the litigant's argument that the Restatement provision in question
has it wrong. Such realizations should serve to caution a Restatement-drafter who may
otherwise be tempted to boldness. They also should require that.., we feel free-if not,
indeed, occasionally compelled-to strip down the machinery of a Restatement's
production process to see whether the product it produces is worthy of being served up to
nourish the body politic.
Wolfram, supranote 47, at 817-18.
59. Charles Wolfram notes, as an example of what he calls "the landscape-altering effect of
occasional Restatement positions," "the amended provision on liability for defective products
inaugurated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which can fairly be described as launching-for
better or worse (with undoubtedly some of both)-the products liability field of litigation."
Wolfram, supranote 47, at 820.
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of the common law of the United States. 60 This statement is particularly
interesting in light of the continuing debate over whether the
Restatement project has changed over time to become normative rather
than descriptive in its approach to the law. Both courts and scholars have
asserted that such a change has indeed taken place.6 ' One court has
expressly stated its dissatisfaction in finding that the Restatements
constitute a remaking, rather than a true restatement, of the law. 62 Two
scholars have taken the criticism a step further, asserting not only that
the Restatement movement has changed over time, but also that this
change has been hidden from the public.6 3

60. See Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 859, 866-67 (1996) ("The Restatement's influence depends on whether courts pay attention to
it, which in turn depends on whether the Restatement actually reflects what is happening in the
courts."); see also Latto, supranote 44, at 717.
The credibility of the Restatements depends heavily upon the fact that their black letter
sections are, indeed, restatements of what the law is (or, in the view of competent
objective observers, is likely someday soon to be), and not the opinion of a group of
distinguished, largely mature lawyers about what the law should or ought to be.
Id.; see also Vandall, supra note 52, at 815 ("To maintain its neutrality and effectiveness, the ALI
must ask how it might return to its mission of restating the common law and avoid becoming merely
another conservative voice for tort reform. Otherwise it is likely to remain dead in the water.")
(citations omitted). The assertions of each of these scholars that the power of the Restatements is in
their functioning as reliable re-statements of the common law, however, raise the question of
whether the ALI's new path will be self-defeating. The question may remain open, in other words,
to what extent a normative Restatement can continue to assert influence, good or bad.
61. See Massey, supra note 41, at 421.
After the ALI embarked on this project, a disagreement quickly arose between the
proponents of two views of the Restatements' function: that of stating existing law and
that of promoting desirable change in the law. After pursuing the former approach during
its first two decades, the ALI changed course and began to adopt rules supported by a
minority of jurisdictions when the majority rules seemed less sound.
Id. (citations omitted).
62. In the case of George v. Walton, 43 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942), the court
considered an argument as to the existence of an attorney's lien against personalty of the client in
his or her possession. In rejecting the lower court's reliance on the Restatement of Agency to
support its holding, the court of appeals stated as follows:
With all due deference to the high authority of the "American Law Institute" under
whose auspices the "Restatement of the Law" has been prepared, our examination of the
law has compelled us to conclude that no such general agent's lien as above stated, exists
at common law and that the above paragraph if given a liberal construction, constitutes
an attempt not to restate but rather to remake the law.
Id. at 517.
63. See generally W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a
Proposalfor Its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 23 (1985). Keyes states that the Restatements "no
longer even purport to 'restate' the law.., yet they continue to use the term 'Restatement' as if they
had maintained the goals of the original Restatements. For this lack of identification it is difficult to
find any redeeming value." Id.at 24-25. Fred Zacharias makes the same point with regard to the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Restatement and
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Several scholars have responded to these criticisms about the
Restatement project's alleged change in vision, defending the work of
the American Law Institute. Herbert Wechsler, former Director of the
Institute, minimized the difference between normative and descriptive,
stating that "there is no clear distinction between what the law 'is' and
what it 'should be. ' '64 John Wade, who served, among other capacities
with the American Law Institute, as Reporter for the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, described the change in the Restatement project as
simply an appropriate response to the way in which the common lawmaking process had itself changed.65 In his view, the current
Restatements, like current court opinions, "are no longer discovering the
true law," believing it to be something "existing independently of the
actions of the courts," but "are instead in the process of managing the
developing66evolution of the common law in order to point it in the right
direction.,

Assuming that the question, "Should [the American Law Institute]
set out to produce a true 'Restatement?' ' 67 is answered in the
affirmative, the next task is to discern where the line is drawn between
restating the law and stating what the law should be. Determining what
the law 68
is can be much more challenging than the casual observer might
assume.

Confidentiality,46 OKLA. L. REv. 73 (1993). He cites several instances in which "the Restatement
asserts new positions, while appearing to be restating the law." Id. at 78-79.
64. Massey, supra note 41, at 422. Massey notes that, "[i]n Wechsler's view, ALl restators
would view their role as a judicial one and would not ignore opportunities to fill gaps in the law."
Id.
65. See generally John W. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to its Increasingly
Advantageous Quality, and an Encouragementto Continue the Trend, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 59 (1985).
66. Id. at 63 ("Openly and frankly declaring that they are changing the law, they are ready to
regard this action as part of the judicial function.").
67. Harold G. Maier, The UtilitarianRole of a Restatement of Conflicts in a Common Law
System: How Much JudicialDeference is Due to the Restaters or 'Who are these Guys, Anyway?',
75 IND. L.J. 541, 543 (2000) (posing the question).
68. Wolfram, supra note 47, at 818-19.
Often heard in debates is the cry that the ALl should hew to the majority of decisions.
(This is often asserted without regard to the fact that only a handful of jurisdictions has
passed on the point in question.) Opposed, of course, is the view-which we have striven
to follow in the Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers-that a substantive
position in a Restatement is warranted as 'restating' the law if it can be rested on the
support of at least one decision in an American jurisdiction. The Institute has
occasionally departed from even that minimalist support position, as it did in adopting its
disclosure-to-save-life provision at the 1996 Annual Meeting. And mini-debates will
sometimes rage about what counts as minimalist support. Considered dicta? A reported
trial court decision? A reported trial court decision in New York?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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B. PoliticalInfluence on the Restaters
The American Law Institute requires that its members, in order
"[t]o maintain the Institute's reputation for thoughtful, disinterested
analysis of legal issues, ..

.

speak, write, and vote on the basis of their

own personal and professional convictions and experience without
regard to client interests ....
,,69
Despite this institutional requirement,
some recent criticism of the Institute has centered on allegations that the
Restatements have been captured by special interest groups. In other
words, even setting aside the debate as to whether the Restatements
should be descriptive or normative, there is significant concern that the
Restatements have become politically biased. 70 The Institute's prestige
and influence has made the group a natural target for interest-group
lobbying. 7 1 One scholar has employed a conflict-of-interest framework
in expressing his concerns that political pressures have resulted in
adulterated Restatements.72 Still others have denied adamantly any
improper political influence on the American Law Institute's work.73

69. See ALl, About the ALl, supra note 42; see also ALl RULES OF THE COUNCIL 9.04
("Members' Obligation to Exercise Independent Judgment").
70. Professor Frank Vandall has levied this allegation pointedly: "The Restatement (Third) [of
Torts: Products Liability] is more like a trade journal, and the new perspective of the ALl is clear on
its face." Vandall, supra note 52, at 814.
71. Wolfram states as follows:
The ALl has not been a stranger to the attention of interest groups. That might be
attempted by an interested party, for example, by retaining a lawyer to exert whatever
pressure could be brought to bear on the Restatement process. If the language ultimately
adopted improves the position of a repeat-player litigant in a future court, the effort may
make economic sense-whether or not the process or the result is desired by the ALl.
Wolfram, supra note 47, at 820-21. Wolfram compares the political pressures on members of the
American Law Institute to those facing contemporary members of the judiciary. In making this
comparison, he states as follows:
It is now accepted in American law that such change-the-landscape decisions by
courts, although rare, do occur in any field in which a court, as a practical matter, has
discretion to reach different results on substantive issues, which is to say more or less in
all fields. It might have been true at one time that potential, repeat-player litigants who
might be burdened or benefited by a future judicial decision would not be motivated or
disposed to take action to affect the result, unless the litigant was a party to the particular
case raising the issue. The one conventional method by which a non-party could be heard
on the question in the tribunal has been through the procedural device of submitting a
brief as an amicus curiae. Another approach, rarely used, is for interested parties to
sponsor academic research whose publication could possibly influence a tribunal's
decision.
Still another possibility is to influence the shape of a Restatement-in-the-making.
Id.
72. Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALl Members in Drafting
the Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1998).
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Some courts have expressed a related concern that the Restatement
process has been dominated by a few powerful, interested parties. This
criticism raises the specter that the Restatements may, at times, represent
the views of powerful individuals (most notably, Restatement reporters),
rather than accurately presenting the common law--or even the
American Law Institute's view of the common law.74 In addition, when
Conflicts of interest on the part of members of the ALl have called into question the
integrity of ALI Restatements of the Law. That is, there is a significant and plausible risk
that the independent professional judgment of ALl members has been materially and
adversely affected by powerful pressures, including substantial financial inducements, to
vote on Restatement issues in ways consistent with their clients' partisan interests. In
addition, there is a significant and plausible risk that the independent professional
judgment of ALl members regarding important Restatement provisions has been
materially and adversely affected by their own financial interests, such as
anticompetitive concerns and potential malpractice liability. These conflicts of interest
have compromised the integrity of the ALI's Restatements of the Law to the point that
no judge, scholar, or student can rely on a Restatement rule or comment as representing
the objective judgment of members, unaffected by the partisanship of advocates who are
creating precedents to protect their clients' and their own interests in future litigation.
Id.at 660.
Freedman gives as an example what he calls "a particularly important provision of the
ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance." He recounts one member's claim that "[y]ou had
corporations calling their outside counsel making it very clear how the client wanted the vote to
come out" and further states that "[in accord with the desires of the corporate-client lobbyists, the
members voted to reverse the judgment of the Reporters as expressed in their original draft." Id. at
643 (footnotes omitted).
73. James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, for example, served as Reporters for the highly
controversial Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Henderson and Twerski have stated
unequivocally that, "In no meaningful sense of the term did we 'play politics' in our roles as
drafters of the new Restatement." James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politicsof the
Products Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 667 (1998). Henderson and Twerski go
on to state that "[f]aw, fairly articulated and evenly applied must, of necessity, impose constraints."
Id.at 686. "Thus," they argue, "political opposition to the Products Restatement may stem not so
much from what it says than from the fact that it says anything at all." Id.at 686-87. Victor
Schwartz concurs as to the Restatement (Third)of Torts: ProductsLiability:
People on the advisory committee did not always "argue" from the point of view that
might appear to be in their day-to-day professional interest. There were genuine, openended discussions where, from time-to-time, people were on the opposite side of where
they might usually be "pegged" by the public or those who knew them.
Schwartz, supra note 41, at 754. Schwartz goes on to state that "[it is absolutely incorrect to
characterize the Restatement (Third) as a defense or plaintiff-oriented work product." Id.
Nevertheless, Schwartz's use of the word "always" and the phrase "from time-to-time" does suggest
that members of the American Law Institute often do, despite the institutional mandate to "leave
one's clients at the door," take such considerations into account. ALI RULES OF THE COUNCIL 9.04.
74. In the case of Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enterprises,
Inc., 530 So. 2d 643 (La. Ct. App. 1988), for example, the court examined the evolution of the tort
of invasion of privacy. The court noted, as a preliminary matter, that this tort "was originally
articulated neither by the common law nor the statutory law but in a law review article." Id.at 645.
The court went on to characterize the modem development of this cause of action as involving four
distinct branches, noting that "the most prominent proponent of this analysis [was] Dean William
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an influential American Law Institute member is also a7 5powerful judge,
the Restatement can become a "self-fulfilled prophecy.
Along the same lines are concerns regarding what former American
Law Institute President Roswell Perkins called an "imbalance of
representation. ' ' 76 Of the Institute's approximately 3,600 members, only
a small fraction normally attend the meetings at which draft
Restatements are presented. 7 One scholar has used these statistics to
demonstrate "how client campaigns to 'get-out-the-vote' of lawyers who
the American
have been induced to vote a particular way can control
78
provisions."
Restatement
on
position
Institute's
Law
Prosser, whose position as reporter allowed his view to be incorporated into the current substitute
for the general common law, the American Law Institute's Restatements." Id. The court's holding
implied that the Restatement reflected Dean Prosser's personal view and may not have been an
accurate representation of the common law.
75. Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 60, at 867. Calabresi and Cooper relate the following
story:
There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, about the Palsgrafcaseand the First Restatement
of Torts. Supposedly, at about the time Palsgrafwasto be decided, Judge Cardozo, who
participated in the American Law Institute, traveled from Albany to New York for a
meeting on the Restatement. At the meeting, there was a big argument on the issue of
Palsgraf.... At a certain point, Cardozo is said to have said,
Well, I don't know whether what I am about to say is quite proper... but the
Restatement, after all, should reflect the law as it is, as well as what we think it
ought to be, and we have a case before us now that raises exactly this question.
While I can't tell you for certain how it's going to come out, I think you ought to
know that my best judgment is that the New York Court of Appeals is going to
hold that negligence is relational ....
This, supposedly, was enough to swing the Restaters because, after all, New York is an
important state, and if that was going to be the law of New York, the Restatement should
reflect it.
Cardozo then returned to Albany, where he went into conference on the Palsgraf
case. It was a very tightly divided court.... [I]n a quiet moment in the conference,
Cardozo said, "Well, I don't know how much we should be affected by the Restatement,
and of course they could change their minds, but I should tell you that I think that the
Restaters are going to define negligence as relational." So, four to three, Palsgraf came
out the way it did, and the Restatement became a self-fulfilled prophecy.
Id. Victor Schwartz raised similar concerns regarding Chief Justice Roger Traynor's opinion in the
case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. Schwartz, supra note 41, at 746-47 (citing Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)). Schwartz believed that Chief Justice
Traynor had used his position as Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court to make case law to
support a concept he desired to see adopted by the Restatements. Id.
76. Freedman, supra note 72, at 643.
77. According to Freedman,
[a]t one meeting dealing with the Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers,
for example, attendance varied from a high of 390 to a low of 150, and an important vote
was decided by a vote of 110-80. Thus, the issue was determined by approximately five
percent of the ALl membership.
Id. at 643-44 (footnote omitted).
78. Id.at 644.
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III.

WHY COURTS FOLLOW THE RESTATEMENTS

Before this article examines the concerns raised by the Virgin
Islands' employment of the Restatements as the Islands' de facto
common law, it must acknowledge several arguments in favor of the
Restatements. Because these arguments are not unique to the Virgin
Islands, this section includes sources from a variety of jurisdictions.
Three major arguments in favor of the Restatements are indicated below.
Two depend on the Restatements' accurately restating what the law is,
rather than what it should be. After presenting each argument, this
section will analyze the extent to which each may be of sufficient merit
so as to outweigh any negative impact of imposing the Restatements as
the de facto common law of a jurisdiction such as the Virgin Islands.
First, use of the Restatements may enhance the predictability of the
common law. A court's history of following the Restatements may make
it easier for both litigants and other courts applying that jurisdiction's
least one
law to predict the outcome of a matter of first impression. At 79
court has described the task as otherwise being near-impossible.
A second reason courts follow the Restatements is that the
Restatements are deemed to represent the general common law of the
United States, as well as it can be determined. This reasoning raises once
more the debate, previously discussed, regarding the essential nature of
the modern Restatements. The Arizona Court of Appeals has stated that
"[o]ne of the reasons, if not the main reason that we follow the
Restatement in the absence of prior Arizona decisions, is that the
Restatement is supposed to represent the general law on the subject in
the United States." 80 Another judge has made the similar statement that
"[t]here is no substantial difference between the common law as
incorporated in the Restatements and the common law of England as
adopted and understood in the United States." 8' Statements like these

79. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated as follows in In re Air
CrashDisaster:

Divining in the absence of any relevant authority how a state's highest court would rule
ordinarily would be as exact as foretelling the future from the flight of birds; however, in
this case we have been spared such an exercise. The Arizona Supreme Court has
repeatedly reaffirmed that, in the absence of a controlling statute or precedent, it will
follow the Restatement of the Law whenever it is applicable.
803 F.2d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 1985).
80. DeLoach v. Alfred, 952 P.2d 320, 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997), vacated on other grounds,
960 P.2d 628 (Ariz. 1998) (citing Cannon v. Dunn, 700 P.2d 502, 503 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)).
81. Bishop v. Bishop, 257 F.2d 495, 503 (3d Cir. 1958) (Biggs, J., dissenting). Other courts'
positive statements regarding the nature of the Restatements, while somewhat more tentative than
those stated above, are similar in tone. In Weinberger v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, for instance, the
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tend to support arguments, such as those presented above, that the
influence of the Restatements depends on their having at least the
reputation of correctly restating the law. These arguments also assume
that uniform law is a positive good. For matters of local law, this article
will argue otherwise-that fit is more important than uniformity. In
addition, it is important to acknowledge that it is not a universally
accepted fact that the Restatements represent general law.82
A third reason courts may give for following the Restatements
strikes even more directly to the core of this article's thesis that the
Restatements tend to support the creation of artificial uniformity. This
view is that the Restatements merely continue a natural trend of
uniformity. One court described this progression toward uniform
national common law as being a natural product of the similarity
between views of policymakers nationwide.8 3 While acknowledging
"centrifugal forces" leading to differences among jurisdictions, the court
notes that "powerful centripetal tendencies often encourage the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York stated, "[i]t
is assumed that if
federal common law were to be applied, under the exceptions implicit in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,...
it would follow the guidelines of the Restatement." 335 F. Supp. 139, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). More
recently, in Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that the federal courts have
relied on the Restatement of Agency as a valuable source for establishing the federal common law
of agency. 231 F.3d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Moriarty v. Glueckert, 155 F.3d 859, 865-66
n.15 (7th Cir. 1998)).
82. See Cannon v. Dunn, 700 P.2d 502, 503 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting the notion that
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 represented "general law on liability of the adjoining
landlord for roots of trees spreading into the subsurface of the neighbor's land"); see also id.
(citing
Small v. Ellis, 367 P.2d 234, 237 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1961) for the proposition that "we do not follow
the Restatement rule blindly," the court in Cannon made it clear that it would not apply the
Restatement without a substantive consideration of the rule's merit); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The
Restatement as a Source of Conflicts Law in Arizona, 2 ARtz. L. REV. 177, 178 (1960) (describing
the Restatement of Conflicts of Law as "a dogmatic structure frequently lacking contact with the
living law"). For this reason, Ehrenzweig argues that the Restatement in question should not be
considered to be even persuasive authority. Id.at 177-78.
83. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York stated as follows in
observing this phenomenon:
While those close to the American law scene tend to emphasize the diversity of
substantive law among the states and between the states and the federal government, to
outside observers much of the differences must appear as significant as that among the
Lilliputians to Swift's hero. Faced with a unique problem, American lawmakers and
judges tend to react in much the same way, arriving at much the same result.
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 696 (E.D.N.Y.1984). This article has
included lengthy citations from this case because the court's analysis is the clearest and most selfaware published opinion on this point.
The Virgin Islands could be a notable exception here. Note, for example, how Louisiana's
civil-law background has mattered significantly in the development of its law. Louisiana-trained
lawyers may thus have a significant advantage over other U.S. lawyers with regard to the study of
international law.
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formulation of national consensus law." 84 The court notes particularly
"the essential homogeneity of our unified technological-social structure
increasingly tied together by national transportation, communication and
educational-cultural networks" and the "Anglo-American legal system
with common roots and a strongly integrated law school educational
system relying upon national scholars, treatises and cases.

'85

The court

thus describes the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute as aiding this trend toward
uniformity. The end of the court's analysis, however, seems to leave an
opening for arguments such as those in this article, by recognizing the
importance of the "reasoning and pool of factual and legal data" that
underlie the law.86 Another court, along the same lines, has called for
greater uniformity among courts in at least some areas of state common
law, as a matter of practical necessity. 87
Again, there is reason to believe that the Virgin Islands could
constitute a notable and instructive exception to the assumption that law
is naturally consistent from place to place. Were it not for the Senate's
across-the-board imposition of the Restatements as the de facto common
law of the Virgin Islands, the Islands, given their geographic isolation
and demographic differences from the rest of the United States, might
otherwise have contributed different and unique "reasoning and factual
and legal data"-and thus different and unique law-to the pool
available to American jurisdictions.
IV.

THE NATURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW

To explain the manner in which the common law process has been
altered in the Virgin Islands through the Senate's having made the
Restatements the Islands' de facto common law, this section will first
address briefly the process through which the common law normally is

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The court states as follows:

When presented with a new problem, we tend to proceed by analogy and by precedent.
Analogies available are much the same for all courts. Even though one state is not bound
by the precedents of another, when a new problem arises courts tend to follow the
decisions of courts of other American jurisdictions since the reasoning and pool of
factual and legal data will tend to be the same.

Id.
87. Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 432 n.1(Ky. 1980) ("[T]he current
system of having individual state courts develop product liability law on a case-to-case basis is not
consistent with commercial necessity. Uniformity and stability in this area are desirable if product
liability insurance rates are to be stabilized at reasonable levels.").
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developed. Discussion will illuminate the manner in which the common
law naturally (1) develops organically over time, (2) responds to
contemporary local mores and needs, and (3) seeks to incorporate the
lessons of experience. Once this section has discussed this process, it
will compare the manner in which the common law has developed to
date in the Virgin Islands.
One characteristic of the natural development of the common law is
that it occurs incrementally. 8 This first quality recognizes the value of a
measure of consistency in the law over time.89 In The Laws, Plato speaks
of the difficulty in making major changes in the law, using the
expression "Hands off fundamentals" to describe the usual, negative
response to wide-scale law reform, especially when core societal values
are implicated. 90 So significant are the difficulties in making widespread
revisions to the law, that Plato recommends an experimental period
when major changes in the law are contemplated. 9 Only after that
ironed out, does
period of time has passed, and all difficulties have been
92
he counsel that the law should be deemed complete.
A second trait of the common law is that it is normally based upon
considerations of fit and fairness. 93 As Montesquieu states, the common
law is intended to have a particularized fit for the jurisdiction that shapes
it, so much so, that it could not simply be transplanted to a different
jurisdiction.94 This conception of the law is consistent with Arthur
Hogue's description of the common law as raw, gritty "social rules,
88. In the case of Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 1293, 1314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Bork, J., concurring), Judge Bork quoted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in describing the
proper role of common-law judges. As Holmes stated, such judges "do and must legislate but...
can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." Id. (quoting S. P.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
89. Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814, 815 (Ala. 1984) (Shores, J., concurring
specially) ("I. .. believe that stability in the law is more desirable in some instances than equity.").
90. PLATO, THE LAWs 684 (Trevor J.Saunders trans., Viking Press 1970).
91. Id at 772 ("[T]hose who administer [the] laws from year to year will have to learn from
experience and settle the details by annual refinements and amendments, until they think they've
made the rules and procedures sufficiently precise. ...This process should continue until every
detail is thought to have received its final polish.").
92. Id.
93. In Ito v. Macro Energy, Inc., 4 N. Mar. I. 46, 56 (N. Mar. I. 1993), the court held that,
"[i]n the absence of legislation, the common law is developed based on the application of general
notions of justice and fair play, taking into account the circumstances and experiences unique to a
particular jurisdiction." Id. at 56.
94. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at 8 ("Laws should be so appropriate to the people for
whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another."); see also
Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 804 P.2d 747, 752 (Ariz. 1990) ("As mandated by our legislature, we define
and apply the common law to be 'consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions
of our state.').
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never remote from life." 95 Montesquieu suggests that even the most
concrete characteristics of a jurisdiction-its climate, its religion, and its
major revenue sources-are ultimately relevant to the shaping of its
law. 96 Speaking more generally of the good than of law, Spinoza speaks
of the importance of context and harmony in determining the value of
any thing-be it law or any other aspect of human life. 97 This viewpoint
would call directly into question the wholesale adoption of the
Restatements-or any other body of uniform law-by any jurisdiction.
Indeed, Montesquieu recommends that those who might seek to transfer
the law of one jurisdiction to another should be cautious, to determine
first whether the two jurisdictions are sufficiently similar in political
institutions and political climate.98 Similarly, Thomas More generally
counsels against imposing foreign law, even if that law appears "more
elegant" in the abstract than the local product. 99 Fit is, however, not
95. ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 3 (Liberty Press 1966) ("Throughout
its long history the English common law has borne directly on the raw facts of daily life in English
society.").
96. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at 9. Montesquieu elaborates as follows:
[The laws] should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate, be it
freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and extent, to
the way of life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should relate
to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants,
their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and their
manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose of the
legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established. They must be
considered from all these points of view.
Id. In The Laws, Plato expresses a similar view. Plato, supra note 90, at 747 (describing the factors
to be taken in consideration with regard to the "climate" of a place and stating, "The sensible
legislator will ponder these influences as carefully as a man can, and then try to lay down laws that
will take account of them").
97. See BARUCH SPINOZA, THE ETHICS OF SPINOZA 95 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., Citadel Press
1957) (1677) ("Insofar as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good."). Elsewhere,
he describes perfection as being "reality," or living in accordance with the "essence" of the thing,
whatever it might be. Id. at 81. Thus, the same thing (for example, the same law) could be "good,
bad, and indifferent," in different contexts, as a matter of fit or misfit. Id. at 80-81 ("For example,
music is good for him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither
good nor bad.").
98. See PLATO, supra note 90, at 610 ("As civil laws depend on political laws because they
are made for one society, it would be well if, when one wants to transfer a civil law from one nation
to another, one examines beforehand whether they both have the same institutions and the same
political right.").
99. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 43-44 (Clarence H. Miller trans., Yale Nota Bene 2001) (1516).
More's analogy is to the performance of a play:
[T]here is... [a] sort of philosophy.., suited to public affairs. It knows its role and
adapts to it, keeping to its part in the play at hand with harmony and decorum. This is the
sort you should use. Otherwise, during a performance of a comedy by Plautus, when the
slaves are joking around together, if you should come onto the stage dressed like a
philosopher and recite the passage from Octavia where Seneca argues with Nero,
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synonymous with popularity, as Plato reminds the reader of The Laws,
through the Athenian Stranger. 10 0 Instead, law can be fair and
appropriate without capturing social favor.
A third characteristic of the normal development of the common
law is its dynamic quality. 10 Plato's description of the law as inherently
over-rigid, related through the Stranger in The Statesman, is meant to
remind the reader that dynamism is essential to the continuing validity of
law.10 2 In addition, despite its shortcoming, the law is described in The
Statesman as representing "the fruit of experience" that justifies its

wouldn't it have been better for you to have a non-speaking part than to jumble together
tragedy and comedy by reciting something inappropriate? By hauling in something quite
diverse, you would spoil and distort the play being presented, even if what you add were
better in itself. Whatever play is being presented, play your part as best you can and do
not disturb the whole performance just because a more elegant play by someone else
comes to mind.
Id.
100. See PLATO, supra note 90, at 684 ("[M]ost people only ask their legislators to enact the
kind of laws that the population in general will accept without objection. But just imagine asking
your trainer or doctor to give you pleasure when he trains or cures your body!").
101. See Lewis v. Wolf, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), overruled on other grounds
by Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983). The court held as follows:
Before stating the common law rule that is followed in Arizona and the reason for the
rule, it would be well to remember the function of common law judges and the role of
the common law. The main characteristic of the common law is dynamism. It does not
remain static. The common law is not a thing of chiseled marble to be left unchanged for
centuries.
Lewis, 596 P.2d at 706. "If this were not so," the court went on to hold, "we must succumb to a rule
that a judge should let others long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives,
do his thinking for him." Id. (citations omitted); see also Ortego v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo.
1995) ("[T]he common law is dynamic and a court can modify it to meet changing conditions.");
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508, 519 n.25 (Okla. 1991) (Opala, C.J., concurring) ("The
common law is not static, but is a dynamic andgrowing thing and its rules arise from the application
of reason to the changing conditions of society. Flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is
its peculiar boast and excellence.") (quoting McCormack v. Okla. Pub. Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740
(Okla. 1980)) (emphasis added); Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 730 P.2d 186, 195 (Ariz.
1986) ("The law must allow for evolution of common law actions to reflect today's needs and
knowledge.").
102. PLATO, THE STATESMAN 294b, from THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1961).
Law can never issue an injunction binding on all which really embodies what is best for
each; it cannot prescribe with perfect accuracy what is good and right for each member
of the community at any one time. The differences of human personality, the variety of
men's activities, and the inevitable unsettlement attending all human experience make it
impossible for any art whatsoever to issue unqualified rules holding good on all
questions at all times.
Id. Because of these limitations, the Stranger goes on to state, "we shall find [the legislator] making
law for the generality of his subjects under average circumstances." Id. at 295.
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imposition. 0 3 This statement brings to mind the famous saying of Oliver
Wendell Holmes,
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
10 4
experience."

This third trait brings to mind one scholar's description of the
function of common law judges as having changed over time, from
discovering the law and declaring the law in their decisions, to managing
the evolution of the law. 0 5 At least two courts have described the task of
"managing the evolution of the law" as being a central responsibility of
the judiciary. 0 6 One scholar has gone a step further, arguing that this
duty cannot properly be delegated-especially not to the American Law
Institute. 0' 7
The wholesale adoption of the Restatements is, of course, not
interstitial, by definition. 0 8 In addition, although a Restatement-based
103. Id.at 300b (concluding that "falny man who dares by his action to infringe these laws is
guilty of a wrong many times greater than the wrong done by strict laws, for such a transgression, if
tolerated, would do even more than a rigid code to pervert all ordered activity").
104. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The law embodies the story
of a nation's development through many centuries."), cited in Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County
Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Wyo. 1990). The court went on to hold as follows:
We have not hesitated to overrule cases that were based on what was perceived to be the
common law at the time the decisions were handed down. We are justified in overruling
prior cases grounded on the common law if they stand for an unfair and improper rule or
have outlived their usefulness, and do not meet changing needs.
Id.
105. Wade, supra note 65, at 62-63. Having so stated, Wade described the Restatements as
changing over time appropriately to reflect this change in the common law-making process.
106. Fuhrman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Iowa 1987) ("The common law
is developed by the courts and is a part of our responsibility.") The court went on to state as follows:
That responsibility includes reevaluation of previous decisions, especially those based on
matters of public policy, and in reevaluating past decisions we do not depart from the
proper role of the judiciary. As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed, regarding changes in the
common law: "This is not usurpation. It is not even innovation. It is the reservation for
ourselves of the same power of creation that built up the common law through its
exercise by the judges of the past."
Id.; see also State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) ("This court has the right and the duty
to develop the common law of South Carolina to better serve an ever-changing society as a
whole.").
107. Ehrenzweig, supra note 82, at 178. Ehrenzweig states in relevant part as follows:
Where a case is not covered by statute or precedent, every court has the power and duty
to adjudicate the case before it in the light of what it considers just in the particular case.
It cannot divest itself of this power and duty by leaving the decision to another
governmental body, let alone a private institution like the American Law Institute.
Id.
108. Indeed, the adoption of any uniform body of law can constitute a radical change. The
Virgin Islands got a taste of this phenomenon in a different context in March 2002 when it adopted
new Articles I and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and repealed Article 6. The V.1. Bar Herald
reported the development as a "dramatic" and "radical" change. From 1962 to 2002: The New
Virgin lslands Uniform Commercial Code, V.I. BAR HERALD, Mar. 11,2002. Virgin Islands
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common law might be relatively dynamic, the changed provisions may
not be consistent with the fabric of the community, or even fair within
that local context.' 0 9 Instead, the common law is to be carefully crafted
by human hands-to borrow phraseology from Roscoe Pound-rather
than by the mechanical application of any body of law. 1 0
In addition, to the extent that adoption of the Restatements has
chilled the perceived need for legislation, it could be argued that the
Virgin Islands Senate has derogated its duties with regard to the creation
of the law. Montesquieu has described the Senate as having a unique
role in protecting the mores of the people, and appropriate law-making
would seem to be a key exercise of this role."' Machiavelli would
describe the United States, as the Islands' purchasing nation (perhaps
even the conquering nation, in a sIense), 1 2 as having an important role
with regard to the preservation of'the independent law-making function
of the Islands, as its dependency.' 1 3 Machiavelli describes this support
for the rule of law as an opportunity for legitimacy-building.' 14 This
need to reinforce good law-making is particularly acute when the
"conquering" nation seeks to maintain the dependent nature of the
'conquered," as the United States arguably has done in maintaining the
Virgin Islands as a dependency rather than allowing the Islands to
achieve statehood.' '5

Uniform Law Commission Chair Tom Bolt echoed this sentiment: "We have gone from 1962 to
2002 in less than 2 years. We have completely new commercial law..." ld.
109. A criticism of the Virgin Islands' use of the Restatements might borrow from the
language of the Lewis court's opinion, that Virgin Islands courts must "succumb to a rule that a
judge should let others [far away] and unaware of the problems of the Djurisdiction] in which he
lives, do his thinking for him." Lewis v. Wolf, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (citations
omitted); see also discussion infra note 101.
110. POUND, supranote 49, at 70 ("In law some situations call for the product of hands, not of
machines, for they involve not repetition, where the general elements are significant, but unique
events, in which the special circumstances are significant.").
111. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at 49 ("The Senate must, above all, be attached to the old
institutions and see that the people and the magistrates never deviate from those."); see also id at 50
(describing the Senate as "the depositary of the mores").
112. Machiavelli describes acquisition of another by purchase as being no easier, and no more
stable, than acquisition by conquest. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 19-22 (Norton 1977)
(1515) (describing the problems that arise, after the acquisition, under such circumstances).
113. Id. at 139 ("Conquest is an acquisition; the spirit of acquisition carries with it the spirit of
preservation and use, and not that of destruction.").
114. Id.at 74 ("Nothing does so much honor to a man newly risen to power, as the new laws
and rules that he discovers. When they are well-grounded and have in them the seeds of greatness,
these institutions make him the object of awe and admiration.").
115. Id.at 144 ("[W]hen a republic holds a people dependent, it must seek to make amends for
the drawbacks that arise from the nature of the thing by giving the people a good political right and
good civil laws.").
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V.

THE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY ANALOGY

This portion of the article will introduce the evolutionary biology
analogy, which provides a framework for the argument that the Virgin
Islands are a "legal backwater" that is worth studying. The essence of6
the argument is that isolated populations often produce new species."
Thus, the very fact that the Islands have been geographically, socially,
and politically isolated from the United States in some significant ways
could lead to their becoming an important resource for the future
development of the law. At least one other scholar has identified isolated
island societies as being7 productive laboratories for observing the
development of the law.'1
In referring to the Virgin Islands as a "backwater" of the law, this
article is employing that part of the term's definition that refers to
"isolation," rather than using the definition pejoratively to suggest that
the Virgin Islands' legal system is backward." 8 Five features of the
Islands might lead one to describe them as a backwater. First, the Islands
are geographically separate from the rest of the United States."19 Second,

116. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
117. In his article, The Law of Tristan da Cunha, JURID. REV. 261 (Part 5 2002), Walter 0.
Weyrauch makes a case for studying the law of Tristan da Cunha, a jurisdiction that he describes as
"a forgotten outpost of the British Empire." Id. at 262. These islands' "autonomy to create law,"
together with (and resulting from) their physical and political isolation, makes them, according to
Weyrauch, a good environment "to get at the spirit of law." Id.
118.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 85 (10th ed. Merriam-Webster, Inc.

1996). My use of the term "backwater" came from Guido Calabresi's Spring 2000 class at the Yale
Law School entitled, "A Common Law for the Age of Statutes" and the class's study of his text
bearing the same title. Judge Calabresi challenged the class to consider the advantages in having
some of what he called backwaters-some parts of the law that do not quite fit the legal landscape.
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 141-42 (Harvard Univ. Press

1982). These bits of law that have not been brought into shape may, according to Calabresi,
constitute resources upon which a court may rely to make changes in the future in an effort to
update existing law. See id.
119. "The islands are about 40 miles east of Puerto Rico, 1,450 miles southeast of New York
City, and 700 miles south of Bermuda." Taylor, supra note 28, at CRS-I. The Islands mark the
easternmost point of the United States and occupy a strategic position in the Caribbean due to their
location in an important shipping lane for the Panama Canal, the Anegada passage. The United
States purchased the Islands for strategic reasons, to protect the Panama Canal and to prevent
Germany from seizing the Islands. See La Motta, supra note 28, at 19 ("During the [first] World
War, the United States feared that Germany might obtain control of the Danish West Indies, thereby
threatening the newly opened Panama Canal."). Even the date on which the United States took
possession of the Islands is significant. See La Motta, supra note 28, at 20 ("At the end of March
1917, one week before declaring war on Germany, the United States took formal possession of the
colony."); see also Walters, supra note 28, at 35 ("American Secretaries of State considered the
Caribbean region [to be] within the United States sphere of influence, which they sought to
dominate, control and protect.").
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they are small in size and produce few products for export. 120 Third,
most citizens of the Virgin Islands are members of an ethnic group that
has suffered centuries of marginalization in the United States. 12 ' Fourth,
120. The Islands as a whole are only twice the size of Washington, DC. See Walters, supra
note 28, at 35. "The land area of the islands covers 133 square miles." Taylor, supra note 28, at
CRS-I. According to the 2000 Census, the population of the Virgin Islands was 108,612.
Population and Housing Profile: 2000; Geography: U.S. Virgin Islands, available at
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/usvifullprofile.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). In 1988,
the population was estimated at 109,500. See Taylor, supra note 28, at CRS-3. This figure makes
the population of the Islands comparable to that of Topeka, Kansas. There is little arable land, as the
Islands are generally hilly, and most food products must therefore be imported. Id. at CRS-I ("The
Virgin Islands of the United States consist of more than fifty islands, islets, and cays, most of which
are uninhabited and uninhabitable."); id. at CRS-10- 11 (citing the Islands' "scarcity of water, the
mountainous terrain, and the poor soil" as factors creating difficulty for the agricultural industry);
id at CRS-I 1 ("According to the Virgin Islands Agricultural Extension Service [in 1988], about
95% of the foodstuffs continue to be imported to the Islands. (St. Thomas imports virtually 100% of
foodstuffs.) Almost all feed stocks continue to be imported as well."). In addition to the difficult
terrain, the Islands are vulnerable to natural hazards that include several recent hurricanes, droughts
and floods, and sometimes earthquakes. Other current environmental issues include concerns
regarding limited natural freshwater resources, an outdated sewage system, and overflowing
landfills. Id. at CRS-2 (stating that "[t]he water supply in the islands remains a serious problem" and
describing
remedial
efforts);
see
also
CIA
World
Factbook
2003,
at
http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook/geos/cq.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) (noting, as a
current environmental issue, the lack of natural freshwater resources).
Tourism, and the two million visitors to the Islands each year, account for more than 70%
of the Islands' Gross Domestic Product and 70% of employment. Taylor, supra note 28, at CRS-7
("Tourism is the largest industry of the Virgin Islands."). The tourism industry is driven by the
Islands' natural beauty and attractive climate. Id. at CRS-2 (describing the "near-perfect climate,
with a temperature range of 70 to 90 degrees at sea level"); see also id. at CRS-8 (describing the
Islands' attractions). Tourism in the Islands has been in a several-year slump but seems to be
improving in the past several years with United and Continental Airlines each having added direct
flights to the Islands in 1999. See Governor Charles W. Turnbull, State of the Territory 2001
Address, available at http://www.usvi.org/sot200l.html (also describing American Airlines and
U.S. Airways as having increased direct flights by 15%). As of 1988, the territorial government
remained the largest employer in the Islands. See Taylor, supra note 28, at CRS-18 (indicating that
the government employs more than 31% of the workforce).
The Islands' limited manufacturing sector includes plants engaged in petroleum refining,
textile work, electronics, watch assembly, and the manufacture of pharmaceuticals. See id at CRS14 (describing the watch industry in the Virgin Islands); Id. at CRS-15 (regarding the Hess Oil
Virgin Islands Corporation). In addition, "[t]he manufacture of rum has been for a long time one of
the major industries of the Virgin Islands." Id. at CRS-13. The Islands are also trying to attract
international businesses and financial services, which currently comprise a small part of the
economy. See Turnbull, supra.
12 1. The population currently is 78% Black, 14% Caucasian, and about 8% of other ancestry.
Population and Housing Profile: 2000; Geography: U.S. Virgin Islands, available at
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/usvifullprofile.pdf. The Islands also currently suffer
from economic woes. The Islands' economy during the 18th and early 19th centuries was driven by
sugarcane grown and harvested with slave labor. See Taylor, supra note 28, at CRS-59 (describing
the rise and fall of the sugar industry in the Virgin Islands); see also La Motta, supra note 28, at 21
("From 1777 to 1807, as sugar cane speedily covered the island [of St. Croix], the annual average of
sugar exports reached 10,778 tons."); see also Taylor, supra note 28, at CRS-75 (describing the
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little immigration occurs between the United States and the Virgin
Islands, and there is therefore little mixing of the Virgin Islands'
population with that of the rest of the United States. 122 Fifth, although
the citizens of the Virgin Islands are also citizens of the United States,
they have only one Representative in the United States House of
Representatives, have no representation in the United States Senate, and
123
do not participate in the election of the President of the United States.
This geographic, social, and political isolation arguably makes the
Virgin Islands a "backwater" of the United States.
The field of evolutionary biology views backwaters as important
resources for growth. Simply stated, evolution, as that term is used in the
field of biology, is a process of descent with modification., 24 The lineage
of organisms changes over time, and diversity arises because lineages
descending from common ancestors diverge through time. 125 The

eventual abandonment of the industry in 1966). Slaves had been part of the Islands' sugar
production since they were first brought to the Islands for that purpose in 1673. Arnold R.
Highfield, The First Annual Isaac Dookhan Memorial Lecture on "Myths and Realities in Virgin
Islands History" at the University of the Virgin Islands 3 (Nov. 14-15, 1996) (transcript available at
http://faculty.uvi.edu/users/ahighfi/writings/mythvihis.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2005)) ("From 1672
to 1807, Danish slave ships transported no fewer than 120,000 Africans to the New World in
bondage, approximately one percent of the total of the entire Atlantic Slave trade."). The end of
slavery in 1848 brought about wide-scale economic decline in the Islands that has continued, to
some extent, to this date. See id. at 4-5 (stating that, although Denmark issued an ordinance
abolishing the slave trade in 1792, the slave population of the Danish West Indies did not
experience emancipation until 1848); La Motta, supra note 28, at 23 ("By the time Denmark
abolished its own slave trade in 1803, 88 percent of the 43,000 people in the [Danish West Indies]
were slaves."). The descendants of the African slaves have continued to have an enormous impact
on the culture of the Islands. Id. at 27 ("African slaves largely shaped the culture of the Danish West
Indies. Whereas most white colonists planned to return some day to Europe, Africans had little
choice but to make the islands their home.").
As of 2001, the most recent date for which numbers were available through the official
Virgin Islands government reporting devices, the Islands' General Fund reflected a deficit of
approximately $100 million. In addition, the Islands at that time owed the United States government
about $1 billion in long-term debt. In 2000, the Islands finally were able to come current on the
issuance of tax refund checks to individuals within the Territory, some of whom had been waiting
since 1995. See Tumbull, supra note 120. Other current difficulties at that time included a teacher
shortage and poor physical plants for schools. See id. In addition, prior to 2000, educators had not
received raises in seven years. See id.
122. 74% of Virgin Islanders come from the West Indies, 13% from the mainland of the United
States, 5% from Puerto Rico, and 8% from other places. See CIA World Factbook 2003, supranote
120.
123. See id.
124. See CARL ZIMMER, EVOLUTION: THE TRIUMPH OF AN IDEA (Harper Collins 2001)
(introduction by Stephen Jay Gould defining evolution as "the genealogical connection among all
earthly organisms, based on their descent from a common ancestor, and the history of any lineage as
a process of descent with modification").
125. See id.
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language of evolutionary biology has been employed to describe the
manner in which the law changes over time to fit the needs of a specific
community as well. 2 6 The term most relevant to an understanding of
how this analogy
works, within the framework of the law, is
' 127
"speciation.'

Speciation is the process by which a single species becomes two or
more species and is considered by many biologists to be the key to
understanding how biological evolution takes place. 28 There are two
major forms of speciation: allopatric and sympatric speciation. 129 This
article employs the former. Allopatric speciation, thought to be the more
common form, occurs when a given population splits into at least two
geographically isolated subdivisions that organisms are not able to
bridge.130 Eventually, the two populations' gene pools change in a
manner independent of one another until they cannot interbreed even if
126. For a description of how the Law & Biology movement, which the author describes as
being in its "adolescence," inforns the study of the law, see E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology:
The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS L.J. 595 (1997). Elliott also chronicles the development of the
movement since the time of its founding by Margaret Gruter in the 1980s. Id. at 596. Another
excellent general resource is LAW & EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: SELECTED ESSAYS IN HONOR OF

MARGARET GRUTER ON HER 80TH BIRTHDAY (Lawrence A. Frolik ed., Gruter Inst. for L. &
Behavioral Research 1999). For a thoughtful critique of what the author terms the too-frequent,
often imprecise use of the evolutionary biology analogy to describe the development of the law, see
M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 31, 43 (1993)
("When one is wedded to a theoretical position, one will also, quite naturally and with no intent to
deceive oneself or others, orient the collection of empirical data towards confirmation of that theory,
then stop looking when the theory is fulfilled.").
127.

ERNST MAYR, EVOLUTION AND THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE: SELECTED ESSAYS 117 (Harvard

Univ. Press 1976) ("Speciation is the multiplication of species, that is, the division of one parent
species into several daughter species."); see also STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 612 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002) (describing how species branch into
daughter species through the process called speciation). As Gould indicates, speciation can occur
through "bifurcation[,] ... where, after branching, the two descendant species both accumulate
differences from an ancestor then recorded as extinct," or through "cladogenesis[,] ...where one
daughter species arises with ... differences, but the ancestral species persists in stasis." Id. at 817.
When we speak of a legal system that speciates through isolation, we necessarily are speaking of a
system of cladogenesis, since the ancestral species (here, the law of the United States or Denmark,
depending on the period in the Virgin Islands' history being considered) remains extant.
128. See GOULD, supranote 127, at 817-18.
129. See MAYR, supra note 127, at 144 (describing the competing research between biologists
who were focusing on each kind of speciation, and further describing Mayr's attempt to show the
superiority of allopatric speciation theory).
130. See GOULD, supra note 127, at 535 (noting the "primary role of geographic isolation as a
sine qua non" of allopatric speciation, and further noting the "near universality" of the theory of
allopatric speciation); see also MAYR, supra note 127, at 141 ("Isolation as such is not an active
factor which produces a character but is a factor which merely preserves a character produced by
some other factor; isolation has, therefore, no direct effects."). Sympatric speciation, on the other
hand, involves only reproductive isolation without geographic isolation. GOULD, supra note 127, at
780 (describing this model).
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they happen to come back together. 1 ' When this process is complete,
the two groups have speciated. 1 32 Geographic isolation is critical to
allopatric speciation. 1 33 Other than geographic isolation, there are no
other factors required to ensure that speciation will occur. 13 4 Sympatric
speciation, on the other hand, involves reproductive isolation without
geographic isolation. 35 The process of allopatric speciation' 36includes
four steps: "mutation, recombination, selection, and isolation."'
Speciation is a creative process resulting in dynamic, complex
systems that have been described as "poised on the boundary...
between order and chaos."'' 37 The new species thus created are
definitionally different from the ancestor species. 138 As such, they have a
separate identity from the ancestor species. 139 Not all geographic
variation that emerges through speciation reflects the need for adaptation
to a new environment; some is merely the result of chance and a matter

131.

See MAYR, supranote 127, at 141.

132. See id.
133. See id. at 129 ("It is now realized that the acquisition of isolating mechanisms is the
crucial step in the process of speciation."); GOULD, supra note 127, at 779 (noting that "most new
species arise from small populations peripherally isolated at the edges of a parental range"). Gould
goes on to note that daughter species "arise rapidly... in geological time,.., both.., in a small
geographic region (the peripheral isolate), and... elsewhere (beyond the borders of the parental
range)." Id. at 779-80.
134. See id. at 535-36 ("Isolation itself, and the severing ofgene flow, rendered any population
ripe for speciation.... [W]ith the least isolation, the first minor gaps [between subspecies] will
appear."); MAYR, supra note 127, at 146 ("Two steps are thus involved in speciation: (1) the
establishment of new populations and (2) the establishment of intrinsic reproductive isolation.").
135. GOULD, supra note 127, at 780 (describing this model, which involves only "reproductive
isolation").
136. MAYR, supranote 127, at 189 (describing these as the "four cornerstones of evolution").
137. GOULD, supra note 127, at 1211 ("Selection achieves and maintains complex systems
poised on the boundary, or edge, between order and chaos. These systems are best able to
coordinate complex tasks and evolve in a complex environment."). See id at 1214 (referring to
another scholar's work describing the "benefits provided by residence at the edge of chaos").
138. Id. at 612 ("Species certainly vary, for the defining property of reproductive isolation
demands genetic differentiation from parents and collateral relatives.").
139. Id. at 606 ("[S]pecies are individuals-in some cases much 'better' individuals than
conventional bodies of organisms-by all vernacular criteria."). Gould describes his criteria for
individuality as including discreteness, cohesion, functionality, and organization, among other
factors. See id. at 602-03; see also MAYR, supra note 127, at 484:
A species consists of a group of populations which replace each other geographically or
ecologically and of which the neighboring ones intergrade or hybridize wherever they
are in contact or which are potentially capable of doing so (with one or more of the
populations) in those cases where contact is prevented by geographical or ecological
barriers.
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of variety, 140 characteristics that at least arguably make speciation an
even more valuable resource to the ancestor species.
Employing the language of speciation, because of the Virgin
Islands' unique history and identity and its geographic, political, and
social isolation from the rest of the United States, the Islands naturally
may have tended to develop law diverging from that of the rest of the
States in a manner narrowly tailored to serve the needs of the Islands'
population. 14' Because, however, the Islands have adopted the
Restatements by statute as de facto common law, this process either may
not have taken place at all or may have taken place only to a limited
extent. 142
In addition, evolutionary biology recognizes the concept of
invasion and its potential destructiveness. The Virgin Islands, having
had foreign law imposed on them for so many centuries, were naturally
vulnerable to legal invasion. 143 The wholesale adoption of the
140. GOULD, supranote 127, at 535 ("It should not be assumed that all the differences between
populations and species are purely adaptational and that they owe their existence to their superior
selective qualities.").
141. The Islands have, for example, developed a local government consisting of an elected
governor and a fifteen-member unicameral senate. See Taylor, supra note 28, at CRS-40. Governor
Charles W. Tumbull currently is in the third year of his first term in office. Virgin Islands governors
are elected for four-year terms. CIA World Factbook 2003, supranote 120.
142. One of the many useful critiques that I received on this article in draft form relates to this
point. It is indeed possible that the Virgin Islands' adoption of the Restatements reflects the Islands'
desire, as a matter of exactly the kind of self-determination for which I advocate in this article.
Many thanks to Jo Ann Palchak for helping me to collect and refine my thoughts on this matter. It
was Spinoza who stated that Nature abhors a vacuum. BARUCH SPINOZA, THE ETHIcs 41 (Joseph
Simon 1981) (1677). Thus there will be a natural trend toward gap-filling, as an organic process. As
a part of this dynamic, the Islands may very well have made an affirmative decision in favor of the
Restatements, for precisely the kinds of reasons enumerated in Section III. These arguments may
ultimately reveal that the Restatements were not an invasive species in the sense that is
contemplated in this section. This would not, however, ultimately negate the fact that the wholesale
adoption of the Restatements effectuated a very real displacement of the common-law-making
process. For this reason, I believe their example merits the in-depth treatment that this article
provides.
143. Prior to the United States' becoming owner of the Virgin Islands in 1917, the Islands had
been subject to Danish rule, on and off, for 350 years. There is some tendency among contemporary
Virgin Islanders to romanticize the period of Danish colonial rule. HIGHFIELD, supra note 121, at I
("It has become a truism among many Virgin Islanders, especially among older ones, that the years
before the transfer of the islands to the United States in 1917 could be viewed as 'the good old
days."'). Denmark colonized Saint Thomas in 1666, and the Danish West Indies Company
controlled the Islands privately until 1755, when Denmark's King Frederick bought them. Taylor,
supra note 28, at CRS-49, CRS-50 (describing the colonization of St. Thomas). In 1800, during the
Napoleonic Wars, Britain blockaded Saint Thomas and occupied the island in 1801. Id. at CRS-52
(describing British occupation during the Napoleonic period). In 1802, Denmark once again gained
control of Saint Thomas. Id. Then, from 1802 to 1815, the British again occupied the Islands until
they were once more restored to Denmark in 1815. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/3

34

20041

Adams: The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement
THE FOLL Y OF UNIFORMITY?

Restatements might fairly be described as an invasion. Applying the
analogy to the development of the common law, the interruption of the
normal common-law-making process may actually be affirmatively
harmful. Montesquieu recognizes the phenomenon of invasion. 144 He
acknowledges the temptation-and danger, due to inevitable misfit--of
a conquering state's imposing its own law on another. 145 Baruch Spinoza
describes this preference for the familiar as a natural-but not a
beneficent-human phenomenon.146 Machiavelli, likewise, recognizes
the inherent difficulties in the first years of any new government and
From 1917 to 1931, the Islands were governed by the Department of the Navy. Id. at
CRS-39. Virgin Islanders remember this era as one of heavy-handedness on the part of the Naval
Government. HIGHFIELD, supra note 121, at 1 (describing the "unhappy results of that 14-year stay"
and the "battleship mentality" of the Naval government). Until 1927, residents of the Virgin Islands
were not citizens of the United States. Id. at 7 (stating that the United States "define[d] the erstwhile
Danish subjects as citizens in the United States but not citizens of the United States" until 1927); La
Motta, supra note 28, at 161 ("On February 25, 1927, President Calvin Coolidge signed a
Congressional bill granting U.S. citizenship to Virgin Islanders."). This matter was the subject of
surprise and disappointment to many Islanders who believed they would become citizens upon the
expiration of a one-year waiting period, as early as 1918. Id. at 69 (describing the celebration of
Citizenship Day, complete with review of the parade by the Governor, in January 1918). It appears
that this decision had racial overtones. Id. at 70 ("The State Department based its ruling on the fact
that black islanders had been subjects, but not citizens of Denmark.").
In 1931, jurisdiction over the Islands was transferred to the Department of the Interior,
and the President appointed the Islands' first civil governor. Taylor, supra note 28, at CRS-39; see
also La Motta, supra note 28, at 71 ("According to the [Congressional] Act [of 1917], the President
had the right to appoint the islands' governor, but in actual practice, the Secretary of the Navy chose
the Naval officers he wished to fill the post."). More than seventy years after the Islands ceased to
be governed by the United States Navy, some military presence remains. The United States Marine
Corps now maintains both an air base on the island of Saint Thomas and an airfield on Saint Croix.
Id.
144. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at 287 (with regard to military invasion, noting that
"nothing is nearer to devastation than invasion").
145. Id. at329.
As one likes to establish elsewhere what is established at home, it would give the form of
its own government to the people of its colonies.... The conquered state would have a
very good civil government, but it would be crushed by the right of nations; the laws
imposed upon it from one nation to another would be such that its prosperity would be
only precarious, and only a deposit for a master.
Id.
146. SPtNOZA, supra note 97, at 78-79 ("[M]en are wont to style natural phenomena perfect or
imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce
upon."). Spinoza uses the analogy of watching a house being constructed by another person:
[Alfter men began to form general ideas, to think out types of houses, buildings, towers,
etc., and to prefer certain types to others, it came about that each man called perfect that
which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and
called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type, even
though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.
Id. at 78. He goes on to describe as "hateful" any attempt to force another to conform with one's
own conception of the good. Id.at 99.
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the former laws and
advises, particularly by way of transition, that
147
stability.
of
matter
a
as
customs be maintained
In trying to Americanize the Virgin Islands, the United States has
imposed its own values and preferences in a number of ways. 148 At least
some sources suggest that the Virgin Islanders have resisted
homogenization into the American culture, conscious of their unique
identity. 149 The legislature of the Northern Mariana Islands expressed
similar sentiments in a very concrete way, demanding a locally-selected
0
appellate judiciary. 15
Thomas More asserts that conquerors often lose interest in their
new possession, when it comes to creating an appropriate and lasting
government.' 5 ' More's statements, which describe the difficulty in
transitioning from a military to a civil government, are descriptive of the
Virgin Islands, which was under Navy rule for the first 14 years of its
history as a United States dependency. 5 2 The disinterest More described
was apparent during this time in the Islands' history: once the United
States had purchased the Islands and thereby neutralized their potential
threat in enemy hands, the Islands lost the federal government's

147. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 112, at 5, 6 ("[A] new prince must always harm those over
whom he assumes authority, both with his soldiers and with a thousand other hardships that are
entailed in a new conquest."). He goes on to state, "nothing is harder to manage, more risky in the
undertaking, or more doubtful of success than to set up as the introducer of a new order." Id. at 17.
148. La Motta, supra note 28, at 10 ("Nowhere else was the process of Americanization more
intense than in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Even more than in Puerto Rico, where a different language
and a stronger national identity mitigated American influence, the colonial administrators of the
Virgin Islands applied American-style solutions to local problems."). La Motta goes on to give the
following illustration: "Virgin Islanders attended schools named after U.S. Presidents, studied
curricula designed for territorial New Mexico and Utah, and learned to celebrate American
holidays." Id.
149. Id. at 11-12 ("Virgin Islanders constantly demanded that federal policies be modified to
meet local expectations."). Stated another way, "Virgin Islanders wanted to be Americans, but they
refused to allow colonial officials to define the terms of Americanization." Id. at 16.
150. Commonwealth v. Super. Ct., 1 N. Mar. I. 287, 298 n.4 (N. Mar. I. 1990) (Hillblom, J.,
concurring) (describing the Commonwealth Judicial Reorganization Act of 1989). Judge Hillblom
went on to state as follows:
The people of the Northern Mariana Islands, through their elected legislators, clearly
wanted a local appellate court chosen and confirmed by their representatives. Rightly or
wrongly, they believed that the members of the judicial branch must directly experience
the effects of their decisions. Living in the Northern Mariana Islands and seeing the
impact of their decisions is important.
Id.
151. MORE, supra note 99, at 16-17 ("[T]he princes themselves, almost all of them, are more
devoted to military pursuits... than they are to the beneficent pursuits of peacetime; and they are
far more interested in how to acquire new kingdoms by hook or crook than in how to govern well
those they have already acquired.").
152. See supra note 1455 and accompanying text.
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attention. 153 Perhaps the wholesale imposition of the Restatements is the
natural and inevitable result of the Islands' history of dependency as the
preceding several paragraphs have recounted. The Restatements may,
simply because they come from a "private legislature," be substantively
different from traditional legislation in significant ways. Two scholars
have argued that private legislatures produce rules that are at times
"vague and imprecise" and at other times "crude but precise," "not
because of their intrinsic virtues as instruments for social control," but
rather "in consequence of a particular institutional dynamic."' 54 When a
jurisdiction, such as the Virgin Islands, adopts the entirety of the
Restatements as de facto common law, these concerns become
particularly acute.
In addition, some courts have expressed discomfort with the lack of
discretion afforded to judges in jurisdictions, like the Virgin Islands and
the Northern Mariana Islands, that have adopted the Restatements as de
facto common law. As Roscoe Pound notes, the degree of discretion that
should properly be afforded to judges in applying the law is a question
dating back to Aristotelian times. 55 Ultimately, Pound sees the exercise
of judicial discretion as an appropriate means of guaranteeing the fit and
fairness of the law in meeting local needs-but only when it is
accomplished openly rather than through indirection. Pound notes the
cyclical nature of judicial involvement in what he calls the
"individualization" of the law. 156 At the extreme, he notes, are those

153. La Motta, supra note 28, at 66 ("With naval bases on Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands were important only if occupied by an unfriendly country; once under U.S. control, the
islands lost their strategic value, leaving the Navy only the task of managing the internal affairs of
the colony."); id. at 88 ("[Flederal disinterest kept the Navy in control of the Islands. Until the
economic collapse of 1930 forced President Hoover to intervene, Virgin Islanders wondered if their
new country had not forgotten them.").
154. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have studied the institutional structures of "private
legislatures" such as the American Law Institute and have described the utility functions their
participants maximize. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597, 651 (1995) (comparing public and private legislatures in
this respect).
155. POUND, supra note 49, at 53 ("The idea that there is no administrative element in the
judicial decision of causes and that judicial application of law should be a purely mechanical
process goes back to Aristotle's Politics.").
156. Id.at 55 ("Carried too far in the stage of equity and natural law, overdevelopment of the
administrative element brings about a reaction, and in the maturity of law individualization is
pushed to the wall once more."). Pound goes on to state that "justice comes to be administered in
large measure through the application of legal standards which admit of a wide margin for the facts
of particular cases, and the application of these standards is committed to laymen or to the discretion
of the tribunal." Id. at 55-56.
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judges who take the law merely as "a general guide."' 157 He describes the
current, hidden means by which individualization is accomplished' as
being injurious to the law, even if necessary, and counsels in favor of a
system of law that would legitimize and standardize judicial
individualization of the law, thus making subterfuge unnecessary. 158
Pound states, however, that the better the legislation, the less need for
judicial discretion. 159 Like Pound, Austin favors the exercise of judicial
discretion, and describes what is commonly called "judge-made law" as
60
being often superior in substance to the product of legislatures.
Without legitimizing -the practice of judge-made law (unlike
Pound and
6
Austin), Hart describes the phenomenon as inevitable.' '
The wholesale adoption of the Restatements has been described as
reducing the freedom of the affected local courts in fashioning their own
common law.' 62 One court has gone so far as to indicate that it believed
the jurisdiction's wholesale application of the Restatements generally
precluded the court from making law based upon public policy, unless
157. Id. at 59. Pound states as follows:
To a large and apparently growing extent the practice of our application of law has been
that jurors or courts, as the case may be, take the rules of law as a general guide,
determine what the equities of the cause demand, and contrive to find a verdict or render
a judgment accordingly, wrenching the law no more than is necessary.
Id.
158. Id.at 60 ("We need a theory which recognizes the administrative element as a legitimate
part of the judicial function and insists that individualization in the application of legal precepts is
no less important than the contents of those precepts themselves."). Describing the current system of
subterfuge as "destructive of certainty and uniformity," Pound goes on to state, "If the courts do not
respect the law, who will?" Id. He adds, later in this chapter, "Only a saint, such as Louis IX under
the oak at Vincennes, may be trusted with the wide powers of a judge restrained only by a desire for
just results in each case to be reached by taking the law for a general guide." Id.at 63. Like Pound,
Austin criticizes the subterfuge, not the idea of individualization. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 191 (Prometheus Books 2000) (1832) (decrying the "timid, narrow,
and piecemeal manner in which [judges] have legislated" and the fact that judges have acted "under
cover of vague and indeterminate phrases... which would be censurable in any legislator").
159. POUND, supra note 49, at 69 ("Where legislation is effective,... mechanical application
is effective and desirable. Where legislation is ineffective, the same difficulties that prevent its
satisfactory operation require us to leave a wide margin of discretion in application.").
160. AUSTIN, supra note 158, at 191 ("That part of the law of every country which was made
by judges has been far better made than that part which consists of statutes enacted by the
legislative."). Austin describes this function as being necessary "to make up for the negligence or
the incapacity of the avowed legislator." Id.
161. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 12 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1961) ("It is only
the tradition that judges 'find' and do not 'make' law that.., presents their decisions as if they were
deductions smoothly made from clear pre-existing rules without intrusion of the judge's choice.").
162. See Ito v. Macro Energy, 4 N. Mar. I. 46, 56 (N. Mar. I. 1993). In Ito the court held that
"Our jurisdiction is not vested with a similar degree of freedom in formulating our own common
law as that exercised by courts in other jurisdictions, because of the statutory dictate that we apply
the Restatement." Id.
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that policy was already reflected in local law.1 63 Along the same lines, at
least one litigant in the Northern Mariana Islands has claimed that the
statute adopting the Restatements as de facto common law is
unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of separation of powers,
is void for vagueness, deprives citizens of their right to vote, and has the
effect of legislation without representation.' 64 A final argument, similar
in tone, stems from concerns that the courts, in employing the
Restatements, or the legislatures, in insisting that they do so, have
improperly delegated authority to the American Law Institute. One judge
raises the prohibition against "federal common law" in articulating this
than the
concern.165 The stakes, as he sees them, are nothing less
1 66
independence and autonomy that our federal system requires.'

163. See Castro v. Hotel Nikko Saipan, Inc., 4 N. Mar. I. 268, 275 (N. Mar. I. 1995) ("If we are
to formulate a rule based on public policy, the policy must be implicated in either local law or a
recognized need to safeguard the welfare of the general public.").
164. In Bolalin v. Guam Publications, Inc., 4 N. Mar. I. 176, 181 (N. Mar. I. 1994), the
plaintiffs argued that application of Restatement provisions pursuant to 7 CMC § 3401 is
unconstitutional. "Specifically, they argue that (1) it violates the separation of powers doctrine
under NMI Const. art. II, § 1, (2) is tantamount to 'legislation without representation' under NMI
Const. arts. VII and VIII, and denies CNMI residents the right to vote under NMI Const. art. II, § 1,
and (3) is void for vagueness." Id. at 181 n. 11. Because, however, these arguments were raised for
the first time on appeal, the court declined to consider these issues. Id. at 181. The court also noted
as follows, in affirming the lower court:
Our courts have repeatedly applied the common law as expressed in the Restatements,
pursuant to 7 CMC § 3401, when our own local written and customary law is silent
regarding an issue presented. Such was the case here. The trial court duly applied
Restatement provisions in the absence of local law.
Id. at 182. The court therefore suggested that it would have held the statute to be constitutional even
if the challenge had been raised below.
165. In Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1985), Judge Bork's
concurrence criticizes the trend toward what he sees as near-automatic application of the
Restatements:
[T]he majority apparently believes that we should adopt the Restatement rule in this case
because in the past the District of Columbia courts have sometimes looked to the
Restatement for guidance in resolving difficult issues of law. But there is no presumption
that if a local court sometimes relies on the Restatement, that court will rely on it for all
future propositions as well. It will often be tempting for federal courts in diversity cases
simply to follow the Restatement rules where local law is silent. The Restatement, after
all, seems authoritative and claims the support of numerous cases. This is a temptation
which we must resist, however, since a practice of always following the Restatement
would be very much like adopting the American Law Institute's conclusions as federal
common law. Under Erie we must not assist in the creation of a "federal general
common law."
Id. at 1312 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 318 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (Brandeis, J.)).
166. In footnote 10 of the Wilson opinion, Judge Bork states as follows:
It is well to remember Justice Field's classic comments on the federal common law
which were quoted approvingly by Justice Brandeis in Erie:
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FIT AND AUTHORITY: JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS AT FINDING SOLUTIONS

The final section of this article will address the extent to which
courts have imposed effective limits of the Restatements' authority,
regardless of whether the Restatements constitute persuasive or
controlling authority in the relevant jurisdiction. This section of the
article will explore the extent to which these techniques have
ameliorated any distorting effect the Restatements might otherwise have
had on the development of the common law. Several of the techniques
the courts have employed with regard to the Restatements bring to mind
the tools that the Honorable Guido Calabresi, professor and dean
emeritus of the Yale Law School and judge on the United States Circuit
has described with respect to
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
167
courts' responses to statutes generally.
One way in which courts have an opportunity to make meaningful
decisions about the use of the Restatements is to make careful
determinations about those that are in draft form, as well as those that
are arguably past their useful life, rather than applying them
automatically. Courts have struggled with the proper weight to be
afforded a Tentative Draft Restatement and the continuing weight to be
given a Restatement that is perceived as being out-of-date. 68 This
struggle is one with which legal philosophy is familiar, in examining the
nature of authority and the twin questions of (1) whether old law is still
law, and (2) whether new law is law yet. In addressing the former
question, Hume describes the changes that can occur with time, even
I am aware that what has been termed the general law of the country-which is
often little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should
be the general law on a particular subject-has been often advanced in judicial
opinions of this court to control a conflicting law of a State. I admit that learned
judges have fallen into the habit of repeating this doctrine as a convenient mode of
brushing aside the law of a State in conflict with their views. And I confess that,
moved and governed by the authority of the great names of those judges, I have,
myself, in many instances, unhesitatingly and confidently, but I think now
erroneously, repeated the same doctrine. But, notwithstanding the great names
which may be cited in favor of the doctrine, and notwithstanding the frequency
with which the doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a perpetual protest
against its repetition, .. .the autonomy and independence of the States.
757 F.2d at 1312 n.10.
167. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 118, at 16-90 (describing techniques common-law
courts have employed to cope with statutes that fit poorly with the rest of the jurisdiction's legal
landscape).
168. To keep the issue in perspective, it may be useful to keep in mind that a Restatement may
be called a Tentative Draft, having already been approved by the advisors to that particular
Restatement and sometimes also the members consultative group, once it receives the approval of
the Council of the Institute, a group of sixty. See ALl, About the ALl, supranote 42.
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with regard to what was formerly a settled issue: "A man's title, that is
clear and certain at present, will seem obscure and doubtful fifty years
hence, even tho' the facts, on which it is founded, shou'd be prov'd with
the greatest evidence and certainty."1' 69 In addressing the latter question,
Hume describes the phenomenon of acquisition of new property "by
accession," when the new property is "connected in an intimate manner
with objects that are already our property, and at the same time are
inferior to them."' 7 ° Borrowing language from Hume, a tentative draft
Restatement could be described as connected intimately with, yet
inferior to, a Restatement that is already in force in a given jurisdiction.
Hume describes the process of acquiring new property in this way as
being near-automatic, and not necessarily involving any substantive
examination of the new property, to determine how its characteristics
might differ from the old. 17 1 As described above in Part II, this
phenomenon, if extended from accession of property to accession of new
Restatement pronouncements, may be of particular concern as the
Restatements have changed in nature over time.
Hart, similarly, describes "continuity" and "persistence" as being
"salient features of most legal systems."' 72 Both are as much a problem
with the transition from one Restatement to another, and the continued
authority of an old Restatement, as with the transition from one ruler to
another, and the continued authority of rules made by a former ruler,
which are the situations that Hart describes. With regard to the former
question of continuity, Hart notes as a preliminary matter that "[t]he
mere fact that there was a general habit of obedience to Rex I in his
lifetime does not by itself even render probable that Rex II will be
169. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 3.2.3 (David Fate Norton & Mary J.
Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739-40). Hume states as follows: "Any considerable space
of time sets objects at such a distance, that they seem, in a manner, to lose their reality, and have as
little influence on the mind, as if they had never been in being." Id. (also noting that "[tihe nature of
human society admits not of any great accuracy; nor can we always remount to the first origin of
things, in order to determine their present condition"). This phenomenon exists, Hume states,
because "[t]he same facts have not the same influence after so long an interval of time." Id.
170. Id. at 3.2.3 ("Thus the fruits of our garden, the offspring of our cattle, and the work of our
slaves, are all of them esteem'd our property, even before possession.").
171. Id. at 3.2.3.
Where objects are connected together in the imagination, they are apt to be put on the
same footing, and are commonly suppos'd to be endow'd with the same qualities. We
readily pass from one to the other, and make no difference in our judgments concerning
them; especially if the latter be inferior to the former.
Id.
172. HART, supra note 161, at 50 (describing "the continuity of the authority to make law
possessed by a succession of different legislators, and the persistence of laws long after their maker
and those who rendered him habitual obedience have perished").
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habitually obeyed.' ' 173 Until Rex II demonstrates his sovereignty, Hart
indicates, "there will be an interregnum in which no law can be
made.' ' 1 74 To prevent the interruption of law-making power, he goes on
to state, legal systems traditionally enact rules of succession.1 75 A
jurisdiction might specify in advance, for example, that each new
Restatement is automatically to become law at some point in time, either
as a Tentative Draft or upon final adoption by the American Law
Institute. In the absence of express rules of succession, the courts of the
Virgin Islands have been
left to determine these matters for themselves,
76
with varying results.
Hart describes persistence as being in essence the same issue as
continuity. 77 He notes, as a preliminary matter, that persistence is not
automatic. 178 As was the case with the question of continuity, however,
Hart asserts that the matter of persistence can be handled effectively
through clear lawmaking that specifies that laws continue past the
79
lifetimes of their makers, lasting until they are affirmatively changed.
Again, because the Virgin Islands have not expressly addressed this
issue, courts have been required to decide these matters for
themselves. 180
The courts of the Virgin Islands have, on several occasions,
followed Tentative Draft Restatements.' 81 In one case, finding that the
final revisions had been completed such that the only remaining task was
the printing of the document, the court held that the Tentative Draft
173. Idat 52. ("There is as yet no established habit of obedience to Rex II....
There is nothing
to make him sovereign from the start. Only after we know that his orders have been obeyed for
some time shall we be able to say that a habit of obedience has been established.").
174. Id.
175. Id. at 53 (describing "rules which bridge the transition from one law-giver to another...
regulat[ing] the succession in advance, naming or specifying in general terms the qualifications of
and mode of determining the law-giver").
176. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
177. HART, supra note 161, at 61 ("The answer to this problem of 'Why law still?' is in
principle the same as the answer to our first problem of 'Why law already?').
178. Id.at 58 ("Of course, acceptance of a rule by a society at one moment does not guarantee

its continued existence.").
179. Id. at 61-62 (describing a rule under which, "[w]hen the individual ruler dies his
legislative work lives on; for it rests upon the foundation of a general rule which successive
generations of the society continue to respect regarding each legislator whenever he lived").
180. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
181. In Remole v. Sullivan, the court considered whether to enforce an arbitration clause by
specific performance, noting that "the decision to enforce or not [was] complicated by the Virgin
Islands' reliance on the restatements of the law." 17 V.I. 193, 195 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1981) (citing I
V.I.C. § 4 (1967)). The court went on to hold that "[t]he task is made difficult because sections of
the Restatement of Contracts on this precise issue conflict with the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts (Tent. Draft No. 12, March 1, 1977) (approved May 17, 1977)." Id.
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could appropriately be considered the most recent (and most
authoritative) statement on point by the American Law Institute. 18 2 The
court's analysis rested on its determination that the relevant portion of
the Tentative Draft had been retained in the version as finally approved
by the full membership of the American Law Institute. At least two other
courts, while noting that a Tentative Draft is not as persuasive as a final
product, similarly chose to follow the draft as the most up-to-date
expression of the law on point. 83 Still another did its own comparison of
the draft and existing Restatements with case law, ultimately finding the
draft provision to be more reflective of the most current Supreme Court
holdings on point.184 These two courts' reliance on a Tentative Draft

182. The Remole court adopted the Tentative Draft, noting that "Tentative Draft No. 12 was
approved subject only to editorial revisions and without § 339, which is inapplicable to this case."
Id. at 195 n.2 (citing 54 A.L.I. PROC. 155 (1978)). "As an approved Restatement," the court
concluded, "the rules of Tentative Draft No. 12 must be used as the rules of decision by Virgin
Islands' courts." Id. at 197. (citing I V.I.C. § 4). The court held as follows, in reaching this
conclusion:
The mere delay in printing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not weaken its
authority any more than a court's slip opinions are less authoritative because of the delay
in their formal publication in bound volumes. Even if the printing delay perpetuates the
new Restatement's status as a tentative draft, there is a persuasive reason for following
it. When the Restatement no longer reflects the common law, an accurate statement of
the law in a tentative draft should be used as binding authority. This is especially true
when, as in this case, the court is asked to choose between an anachronism from the
1932 Restatement of Contracts and the tentative draft's accurate expression of prevailing
law.
Id. (citations omitted).
183. In Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977), the court noted the
defendants' argument that, although I V.I.C. § 4 looks to the Restatements as a representation of
United States common law, "a tentative draft [does not rise] to the same dignity as the final section
as approved by the American Law Institute." Id. at 180. The court responded as follows:
[W]e read the statute as looking to the Restatements only as an expression of "the rules
of common law"; we do not believe it contemplates strict adherence to old Restatements
which no longer accurately summarize the common law. Admittedly, a Tentative Draft is
not as persuasive a source of information on "the rules of common law" as is a draft
which has received final approval. But we are satisfied that the weight of authority now
lies behind the position in the Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement [of Torts],
rather than that contained in the First Restatement, which dates from 1939.
Id. See also Torres v. Bennett, 13 V.I. 443, 454 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1977) (citing Varlack and choosing,
like the Varlack court, to adopt the position set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, then in
Tentative Draft form).
184. Clarenbach v. Consol. Parts, Inc., 17 V.I. 123, 130 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1980) (citing Varlack,
13 V.I. at 180, for the proposition that "1 V.I.C. § 4 (1967) does not mandate strict adherence to old
Restatements which no longer accurately reflect the state of the common law"). The Clarenbach
court went on to hold that "[i]t is the opinion of this Court, particularly in light of the recent
Supreme Court decisions on the subject, that the Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 88 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1975) supersedes the position adopted by the First Restatement with respect to application of
collateral estoppel by a non-party." 17 V.I. at 130.
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therefore was based, not upon the American Law Institute's ultimate
acceptance of the provision in question, but rather upon each court's
independent determination that the provision more accurately reflected
United States common law than that contained in the First Restatement
that it was to replace. In addition, at least one Virgin Islands court has
rejected the application of a Tentative Draft Restatement, based on the
holding that these works in progress are not entitled to the same degree
of reliance as those that have been promulgated by the organization as
final products. 185 Finally, one court has adopted a compromise position,
recognizing that the Tentative Drafts are not controlling, as they would
be if they were finally adopted, but describing them as having strong
persuasive authority. 186 What remains unclear is whether a Virgin
Islands court would adopt a Tentative Draft Restatement without
considering either, as the first court did, whether the Draft had become
part of the Institute's final product or, as the other courts did, the
relevant individual provision's substantive merit.
An additional case suggests that Virgin Islands courts may at times
discard an outdated Restatement rule in favor of the larger body of
common law as developed to date.' 87 Thus, at least one Virgin Islands
court has interpreted 1 V.I.C. § 4 as requiring courts not to apply
Restatement provisions blindly, but rather to apply only those provisions
that accurately represent United States common law on point.
Courts also may limit the application of the Restatements by
insisting that they be interpreted in context and in conjunction with
general principles of equity. 188 This approach is consistent with Pound's
185. Action Engr. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 18 V.I. 485, 497 n.5 (D.V.I. 1981) ("Although
this court has tempered its reliance on the Restatements in view of the date of their publication
[citing James v. Bailey] and on occasion we have utilized the tentative drafts, we are in no manner
obligated to accept positions proposed in the tentative drafts.").
186. Marcelly v. Mohan, 16 V.I. 575, 583 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979) ("Tentative drafts of the
restatements not as yet approved by the American Law Institute, while not rising to the same dignity
as if finally approved, are a persuasive source of information on the rules of common law.").
187. Haize v. Hanover Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1976). The Haize court held that "[ilt
could be argued that the 1942 Restatement of Judgments no longer expresses the rules of the
common law to the extent it requires mutuality, and that therefore the common law 'as generally
understood and applied in the United States' governs." Id. at 578 n.1 (citing James v. Bailey, 370 F.
Supp. 469 (D.V.I. 1974)). In addition, in at least one case, a litigant tried in vain to convince the
court that a Restatement was outdated and should be discarded. Bank of Nova Scotia v. St. Croix
Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 728 F.2d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting one party's argument that the
Restatement of Security was "old" and "no longer reflect[ed] the common law accurately").
188. In James v. Bailey, the court stated as follows:
I do not feel that the imposition through 1 V.I.C. § 4 of the Restatement as the rule of
decision in this case precludes me from taking cognizance of and applying well
recognized principles of equity which temper the effect of this rule. The Restatement
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view of equity as "a remedial system alongside of the law, taking the law
for granted and giving legal rights greater efficacy in certain
situations." ' 89 Aristotle, similarly, describes equity as superior to the
law, in that it is a "rectification of legal justice," where the latter can be
erroneous in its application to a particular case. 190 Equity, generally
understood, thus allows a court fully to effectuate justice within the
bounds of the law.
In addition, several courts have limited the application of the
Restatements by insisting that they not be applied to create new causes
of action or to change old causes of action absent legislative
intervention.191 In explaining its holding, one Northern Mariana Islands
court discussed 7 C.M.C. § 3401, a statute of the Northern Mariana
Islands that, like 1 V.I.C. § 4, "provides for the almost wholesale
application of the rules of law, in the absence of written or customary
law, [and stated that § 3401] is a broad statute in existence since the days

must be read together with its comments which acknowledge 'principles of restitution
for mistake' and the role that equity has played in relieving hardships caused by the rule.
Furthermore, I cannot ignore the fact that the Restatement was written in 1937 and
should not be applied without some consideration of more recent developments.
370 F. Supp. 469, 472 (D.V.I. 1974). The court's analysis also takes into account some of the
considerations discussed above in Part II: namely, the degree to which the Restatement provision
continues to reflect United States common law on point.
189. POUND, supra note 49, at 65 ("Such was the orthodox view of the relation of law and
equity. Equity did not alter ajot or tittle of the law.").
190. THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 1137 (J.A.K. Thompson trans., 1955). Aristotle goes on to
state as follows:
The explanation of this is that all law is universal, and there are some things about which
it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in cases where it is
necessary to make a general pronouncement, but impossible to do so rightly, the law
takes account of the majority of cases, though not unaware that in this way errors are
made.... So when the law states a general rule, and a case arises under this that is
exceptional, then it is right,... to correct the omission by a ruling such as the legislator
would have given if he had been present there, and as he would have enacted if he had
been aware of the circumstances.
Id.
191. See, e.g., Borja v. Goodman, 1 N. Mar. I. 225 (N. Mar. I. 1990). InBorja v. Goodman, the
court addressed the relative responsibilities of the legislature and courts, as follows:
Any change to the common law rule of defamation, including the available defenses,
should come from the legislature. The reason for this is that courts are generally not
equipped to address such changes. The wisdom of the general application to the
Commonwealth of the rules of the common law (as laid out in the Restatements of the
Law), in the absence of written or customary law, is a matter that is ordinarily best left to
the legislature. I would agree that there may be occasions when specific applications of
certain common law rules would not be appropriate. I am not, however, persuaded that
the duty appellant urges us to impose on defendants is justifiable in the instant case.
Id. at 238 (footnote omitted).
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of the Trust Territory Administration. 1 92 The court characterized the
statute as a "'shorthand' attempt to fill a gap due to the absence of
statutory laws in many areas."' 93 The court's characterization begs the
question of whether, as the law in the Northern Mariana Islands
continues to develop, the Restatements should become a less important
part of this development process. In addition to the majority's assertion
that § 3401 represents a "shorthand" attempt to fill gaps in the
Commonwealth's law, the concurrence describes the Commonwealth's
"almost wholesale" application of the Restatements as a second reason
to interpret their provisions narrowly, so as to prevent courts1 94from going
too far in taking over what is naturally a legislative function.
Another court, in holding similarly, has asserted that it believes it
has the responsibility to assess each proposed new cause of action
according to "principles of justice" and its substantive merits, rather than
"blindly" adopting Restatement provisions that would create such causes
of action.1 95 Indeed, refusal to adopt new Restatement196 provisions
"blindly" is a theme that shows up in other opinions as well.

192. Id.at 238 n.4.
193. Id. The concurrence echoed this characterization interpreting the statute and stated that
"[t]he purpose of 1 TTC 103 was not to make laws of a foreign jurisdiction applicable as a
substitute for laws of-the Trust Territory but, rather, to provide substantive law absent 'written law'
covering the given subject." Id.at 248-49 (Hillblom, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 248 (Hillblom, J., concurring).
1 TTC 103 adopts the law found in the Restatement. The adoption of the Trust Territory
Code 103 is an adoption of a specific statute. However, the Trust Territory Code section
103 does not expressly adopt a specific statute but adopts the Restatement in its entirety.
Here, a body of law rather than specific laws are made applicable by reference. When a
court is called upon to apply and pick and choose from such a large body of laws it in
fact legislates, a function which is traditionally reserved to the people or the legislature.
Thus, I believe we should construe such statutes narrowly. I would construe 7 CMC
§ 3401 as applying if the court determines there is no "written law" in the Northern
Mariana Islands applying to the subject matter of the case and controversy at issue. This
ruling would not prohibit the court from looking to the law of other jurisdictions in the
process of interpreting "written law" but the court could not apply as substantive law 7
CMC § 3401 where "written law" exists.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
195. See Small v. Ellis, 367 P.2d 234, 237 (Ariz. 1961). The Arizona Supreme Court declined
to use the Restatements to create a new cause of action, even though the court had "previously
stated that where not bound by previous decisions of this court or legislative enactment we will
follow the Restatement of the Law." Id. at 236 (quoting Ingalls v. Neidlinger, 216 P.2d 387, 390
(Ariz. 1950)).
We think it would be unwise to follow this rule blindly, particularly when to do so would
result in the recognition of a new cause of action in this jurisdiction. In view of our
former pronouncements, great weight must be given to the recognition of this, right in
the Restatement of the Law, but notwithstanding this, we deem it our duty to consider
the merits of this new right. If it is basedon principles ofjustice, and has been generally
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Other courts, on the other hand, have been willing to follow the
Restatements even when doing so changes the jurisdiction's law on
point. One court has indicated that its willingness to do so stems from
the fact that other courts tend to do the same. 197 The court, in other
words, seems to have adopted the Restatement rule because other courts
had accepted it, without weighing its merit independently. Another court
has given the Restatement provision dispositive authority, holding that it
was unnecessary to cite any authorities other than the Restatement, in
support of a particular point being argued. 98 Still another has held that
the Restatement's endorsement of a position is not in itself99dispositive
but is sufficient to allow a litigant to escape directed verdict.'

acknowledged elsewhere, there would seem to be no reason why the cause of action
should not be consideredas existing here.
Id. at 237 (quoting Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 162 P.2d 133, 138 (Ariz. 1945)). The court's
consideration of whether the Restatement provision in question was supported by "principles of
justice" brings to mind the language the Ito court used, see discussion supra note 93, in describing
the natural development of the common law.
196. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Alfred, 952 P.2d 320, 322-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997), vacated on
other grounds, 960 P.2d 628 (Ariz. 1998) ("Notwithstanding the general rule that we will follow the
Restatement, we will not do so blindly.").
197. See State v. Garzell Plastics Indus., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Mich. 1957). The
court held as a preliminary matter as follows:
The American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Torts makes a clear statement
which is on its way toward general acceptance as the rule of manufacturer's liability ....
This section has been expressly cited and approved in numerous Federal and state court
decisions. In many recent decisions of U.S. Courts of Appeal, the extent of the duty of
the manufacturer has not even been discussed, it being assumed that the manufacturer
did have a duty of care extending beyond the persons with whom he had contractual
relations.
Id. Having so held, the court concluded that, "[ulpon all the foregoing it cannot be imagined that the
Maryland Court of Appeals would deny the liability of Garzell Plastics in the circumstances here
presented."Id at 486.
198. See Matthis v. Kennedy, 67 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Minn. 1954) ("It is unnecessary to cite any
further decisions or authorities in view of the fact that the American Law Institute in its Restatement
of the Law of Torts (1938) has in its chapter on defamation stated the rule as it relates to classes of
privilege ... ").
199. See Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 1293, 1308 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
[W]e do not, as the concurrence states, "endors[e] the Restatement even though [we]
disapprove of what the Restatement says." We conclude that the plaintiffs offered
sufficient evidence to go to the jury under a circumstance-specific peculiar risk theory
based on the evidence that the defendant took no action, including its vendors, designed
to minimize a specific known risk. That theory of liability, firmly rooted in the
Restatement, is enough to defeat a directed verdict.
Id. (citations omitted). The court stated, "[w]e do not seek to impose the whole of sections 413 or
427 onto the law of the District of Columbia---even for the purpose of deciding this case." Id. at
1308. The court concluded, however, by reaffirming the persuasive authority of the Restatements:
"we can confidently say that if local courts behave in the future as they have in the past, they too
will look to the Restatement for guidance in determining difficult and novel issues of tort law." Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:423

In contrast to those courts that have refused to allow the
Restatements to create a new cause of action, absent legislative
involvement, are those insisting that the legislature indicate if any
Restatement provisions are not to become law. At least one Virgin
Islands court has assumed that its task is to apply all Restatements in the
absence of controlling law on point, not simply those Restatement
200
provisions that accurately represent United States law on point.
The unique history of the Virgin Islands provides an additional
means by which Virgin Islands courts may limit the application of
Restatement principles. When there is law that pre-dates the United
States ownership of the Virgin Islands, i.e., Danish law, such law will
take precedence over the Restatements. Such situations are particularly
likely to arise in property law disputes. 201 Thus, although Virgin Islands
courts are bound by statute to apply Restatement provisions in the
absence of controlling authority on point, a flexible definition of the
term "controlling authority" may at times allow a consideration of law
dating back as early as 1666.202
Another way in which Virgin Islands and Northern Mariana Islands
courts can control their reliance on the Restatements is to define
carefully the kind of cases in which they constitute controlling authority.
One area of substantive dispute within the Virgin Islands and Northern
Mariana Islands is whether the Restatements govern in the absence only
of statutory law, or in the absence of any written law, including local
case law or customary law. Several courts have found that the

200.

In the case of Monk v. Virgin Islands Water & PowerAuthority, the court held as follows:

[U]nlike other jurisdictions, where the Restatement merely serves as a summary of
general legal principles for courts to accept or reject, the Virgin Islands has designated
the Restatements as its law, until a contrary statute is approved. Therefore, if the Virgin
Islands wishes to abrogate the doctrine of assumption of risk, along with Section 343A
of the Restatement, its legislature must say so, as it did in 1973 with contributory
negligence.
53 F.3d 1381, 1387-88 (3d Cir. 1995).
201. See Red Hook Marina Corp. v. Antilles Yachting Corp., 9 V.I. 236, 241-42 (D.V.I. 1971)

(rejecting the application of United States common law which presumed United States ownership of
land in the Virgin Islands under certain tidal water conditions because "the rules of common law do
not necessarily govern property relationships in the Virgin Islands."). The court clarified as follows:
Anglo-American common law has been received into Virgin Islands jurisprudence only
in relatively recent times. Therefore, property rights in the islands are rooted in the law
existing while the islands were under Danish sovereignty, which law remained in force
even after the transfer of sovereignty to the United States in 1917. These rights were
preserved after cession by treaty and generally understood rules of international law and
remained unaffected as well by the later adoption of common law.
Id.
202. See supra note 143 (providing a brief timeline of the Islands' history under Danish rule).
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Restatements apply only when there is no local precedent on point
whatsoever. 0 3 Additionally, at least one court has expressly stated that
local customary law is to be given precedent over U.S. common law in
this calculus.20 4 Others, however, have stated that only local statutory
law on point will preempt the automatic application of the
205
Restatements. In addition, at least one court has expressly stated that
the Restatements outrank local case law.20 6
Bringing together several of the themes from this section, the
strongest statement by a Virgin Islands court choosing not to follow the
Restatements comes from Murray v. Beloit Power Systems, Inc. 20 7 The
Murray Court declined to follow the position advanced by either litigant
as to the relationship between the tort defense of contributory negligence
-and the doctrine of assumption of the risk. Setting aside the Restatement
(Second) of Torts provision on point, the court crafted its own rule of

203. See Co-Build Co. v. V.I. Refinery Corp., 570 F.2d 492, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1978) (declaring
that "since there are no Virgin Islands' precedents which are applicable, we must look in the first
instance at the relevant provisions in the Restatement of Law, Contracts."); Does I v. The Gap, Inc.,
No. 01-Civ-0031, 2002 WL 1000068 at *19 (D.N. Mar. I. May 10, 2002) (relying on statutory law
for the proposition that the Restatements are binding "in the absence of written law or customary
law to the contrary"); Benjamin v. Cleburne Truck & Body Sales, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1294, 1296
(D.V.I. 1976) ("Virgin Islands law, absent contrary local law or statute, incorporates the principles
enunciated in the restatements of the law approved by the American Law Institute."); I.G.I. Gen.
Contractor & Dev., Inc. v. Public Sch. Sys., 5 N. Mar. I. 250, 10 (N. Mar. I. 1999) (same holding);
Castro v. Hotel Nikko Saipan, Inc., 4 N. Mar. I. 268, 272 n.5 (N. Mar. I. 1994) ("In the absence of
contrary statutory or customary law, this Court applies the common law as expressed in the
Restatements."); In re Estate of Seman, 4 N. Mar. 1. 129, 131-32 (N. Mar. 1. 1994) ("[O1nly in the
absence of local written or customary law may we consider the common law as enunciated in the
Restatements."); Bd. of Dirs. of Shibui Condo. Ass'n v. Consol. Int'l., Inc., 28 V.I. 57, 75 n.12 (V.I.
Terr. Ct. 1993) ("In the absence of written or case law to the contrary, the Restatements of the Law
are the rule of law in this jurisdiction."); Wilson v. Joseph, 28 V.I. 29, 33 n.2 (V.I. Ten. Ct. 1992)
(same holding).
204. See In re Estate of Rofag, 2 N.M.I. 18, 32 n.7 (N. Mar. I. 1991) ("7 CMC § 3401
generally upholds customary law by giving it priority over common law.").
205. See Tenorio v. Reliable Collection Agency, Inc., No. 02-Civ-0038, 2003 WL 23150110,
at * 4 (D.N. Mar. I. Dec. 31, 2003) ("In the absence of statutory law, Commonwealth courts look to
the law 'as expressed in the restatements of the law approved by the American Law Institute and, to
the extent not so expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United States."'). This court
then went on to allow the Restatement to create a new cause of action for invasion of privacy in the
jurisdiction. See id.; see also V.I. Distributor, Inc. v. Durkee Foods, 19 V.I. 85, 92 (D.V.I. 1982)
("The restatements of law approved by the American Law Institute are only pertinent if there are no
existing applicable Virgin Islands statutes.").
206. See Prime Hospitality Corp. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. 1997-Civ-91, 1999 WL 293865
at *2 n. 8 (D.V.I. Apr. 29, 1999) ("[C]ourts in the Virgin Islands look first to enactments of the
Virgin Islands Legislature, then to the common law as embodied in the Restatements, then to
decisions of local courts when no Restatement is on point, and finally to the general common law of
the United States.").
207. 450 F. Supp. 1145 (D.V.I. 1978).
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decision, grounded in the concept of comparative fault.20 8 This case
illustrates several recurring themes: (1) the argument that, to be
authoritative, the Restatements must be descriptive of the current state of
the common law, rather than the state of the law as the American Law
Institute believes it should be; 20 9 (2) the dynamic nature of the common
law; 210 (3) the prerogative (and even responsibility) of the judiciary with
regard to the development of the common law; 21' and (4) the desire,
wherever possible, to follow the "best law," law that has been uniformly
recognized as such by other jurisdictions. 2 12 The Murray court used each
principle as an opportunity for crafting an individualized holding that
represents reasoned lawmaking at its best.
VII.

CONCLUSION

One item of which readers may take note is that many of the cases
and a number of law review articles cited in this article date back to the
1950s and 1960s. In many ways this fact may show why this area merits
attention at this time; namely, that few recent courts have been so selfaware as to consider the manner in which Restatements are employed.213
In addition to the passage of time, the last time a large number of
courts seriously considered the appropriate role of the Restatements was
during an era in which the Restatements themselves were different. The
Restatements have become more normative over time and also have
become increasingly vulnerable to interest group politics. Many courts,
however, have continued to employ the Restatements in the same near208. Id. at 1147 ("[I]t is the opinion of -this Court that the imputation of comparative
negligence principles, as defined herein, in strict products liability cases will provide the most
equitable means of ascertaining ultimate tort liability.").
209. Id. (citing Varlack, 550 F.2d at 180, for the proposition that "the restatements constitute
the rules of decision in the Virgin Islands only to the extent that they accurately express prevailing
rules of common law"); see also supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
210. Murray, 450 F. Supp. at 1147. (citing Co-Build Cos., Inc., 570 F.2d at 495 for the
proposition that "this Court has the power to deviate from prevailing rules of common law to create
'local laws to the contrary' within the meaning of I V.I.C. § 4"); see also supra notes 101-07 and
accompanying text.
211. Murray, 450 F. Supp. at 1147. ([Tlhe prevailing rules of common law constitute no more
than rules of decision, and though binding as such on foreign jurisdictions seeking to apply Virgin
Islands law, are binding on local courts only in the absence of local case law or statutory law to the
contrary.").
212. Id. ("[T]here is an absence of a genuine, overwhelming consensus among the various
American jurisdictions as to the application of the defense of contributory negligence in the realm of
strict products liability.").
213. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott raise this concern as well. See Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 154, at 650 ("Private law-making groups such as the ALl and NCCUSL have not received
serious scrutiny").
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automatic fashion as they have since the project's inception. As of April
1, 2003, the Restatements had been cited a total of 158,183 times.214
This continuing fidelity to a changed product is of particular
concern in jurisdictions such as the Virgin Islands and the Northern
Mariana Islands, in which the Restatements have been adopted as de
facto common law. In addition to concerns about whether the
Restatements continue to merit such reliance, there is a second cost to
the Restatements' use in these two jurisdictions. Because these groups of
Islands are backwaters in the United States legal system, employing an
evolutionary biology analogy, the "speciated" common law the Islands
would have naturally developed might otherwise have been an excellent
resource from which the rest of the country could have benefited.
Courts that apply the Restatements should not do so without
analyzing their substantive merit. The 1998 case of Ramirez v. Health
Partners of Southern Arizona2 15 provides an excellent example of how
this may be accomplished. In considering the application of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to a matter involving the donation of parts
of a human body, the court held, "we must consider whether the
Restatement position, as applied to a particular claim,... is consistent
with Arizona law and policy, and has generally been acknowledged
elsewhere. 2 16 This approach is consistent with the way in which
common law courts historically have attempted to consider justice, fit,
and fairness, in making decisions regarding the development of the
common law. 217 The American Law Institute should welcome this
recommendation as pushing toward (and expanding confidence in) the
development of a Restatement product and helping to ensure that the
Restatements fulfill their intended purpose.

214.
215.
216.
217.

ALI, 2003 Annual Report, available at http://www.ali.org.
972 P.2d 658 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
ld. at 665.
See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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